Daily Report

East Europe

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FBIS-EEU-94-144 *27 July 1994*

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Charges of Government Involvement in Oil Smuggling

AU2607190694 Tirana ALEANCA in Albanian 26 Jul 94 p 3

[Article by Gjergj Zefi: "Nevertheless, the Embargo Is Broken Every Day"]

[Text] The breach of the embargo against the former Yugoslavia is now a very sensitive problem in Albania, preoccupying all the highest-level authorities of the Albanian State. They have been accused by the foreign and national press, with evidence and real facts, and have set in motion a despairing campaign of denials. Besides newspapers and press spokesmen, the Albanian State has involved in these vain efforts foreign officials who amazingly come out in defense of the Albanian Government's game with the embargo, as in the statement by Fraco Letrari, chairman of the SAM (Sanctions Assistance Mission) Albania, published on Saturday [24 July] in ATA's tabloid LAJMI I DITES.

"Besides the scandalous articles by certain newspapers that do no good but only harm, I can say that I am confident that Albania is enforcing the sanctions. Contraband trucks do not cross the Montenegrin border either by day or by night," Mr. Letrari says in his statement.

The statement by this foreign official, who, of course, cannot check the enforcement of sanctions as he sits with a whiskey bottle in the bar of the Dajti Hotel, is utterly ridiculous to those who live on both sides of the Albanian-Montenegrin border. Mr. Letrari's statement resembles the enthusiastic speeches of Joao Amazonas, who, after filling his pockets with dollars, hastened to sing the praises of the Hoxha regime in Albania and to show the "achievements and successes" of socialist Albania. Regardless of what Mr. Letrari says, Albania has broken the embargo and is continues to do so today.

The reader may like to know that even as he reads these lines, Albanian oil is crossing the Montenegrin border and members of the Albanian Government are filling their pockets with money from this illegal traffic.

Europe now knows. Broadcasts by different television stations and many articles in national and foreign newspapers have described it at length.

The problems with the embargo are not as Mr. Letrari attempts to portray them when he explains that it is "normal for ordinary people to attempt to speculate for reason of profit." The problems with the embargo in Albania are at the highest level. They involve members of the two countries' governments. This is best shown by the huge collection points for fuel resembling large enterprises on both sides of the border, as well as the pipes linking the two banks at the Muriqan border post, to which a German television station devoted a program of about 90 minutes. The two tanker trucks with Albanian license plates that were accidentally burned on the other side of the Montenegrin border also testify to the violation of the embargo, as do the dismissals from their jobs of members of the Shkoder Financial Police who dared to denounce it.

Mr. Antun Masle, correspondent of the large Croatian newspaper GLOBUS and author of the "offending" article "Berisha Involved in Oil Smuggling With Serbia," was himself present as we were looking at the largest fuel collection point in Kamenice, when one of the smugglers came up to us, thinking that the Croatian journalist's comfortable car belonged to the government, and asked us, "Aren't you connected with Bashkim Kopliku?" (!)

All these things, alongside other facts which I reserve the right not to publish just now, show best to what degree the Albanian state, of which Mr. Letrari says he is "very confident," enforces the UN sanctions.

Although the chairman of the Sanctions Assistance Mission, Mr. Letrari, is more worried about being manipulated for political purposes than he is about the embargo. (?!)

I would suggest to Mr. Letrari that, if his statement is sincere and he really does not see the Albanian state breaking the sanctions, he should move around a little more and perform with more dedication the mission entrusted to him by the CSCE (I will give him all the assistance I can), or, if he himself is involved in the game with the Albanian Government, he should at least keep quiet.

Meanwhile, I would say to the president and the Albanian Government that they have no reason to take so much trouble to show us that the shamelessness of their rule has its equivalence even in Europe.

There is a Chinese proverb that says: "Do not worry about the night when the sunset is so beautiful."

Editorial Views Importance of Perry's Visit

AU2607133594 Tirana RILINDJA DEMOKRATIKE in Albanian 23 Jul 94 p 1

[Editorial: "Albania, Leader of the Post Communist Countries. In the Aftermath of Mr. Perry's Visit to Tirana"]

[Text] The U.S. defense secretary's appraisals of developments in Albania were surpassing good. It was not for nothing that he described Albania as the first country in Central and Southern Europe in terms of political, economic, and military reforms. The same appraisals of Albania have already been pronounced by other top-ranking officials too, such as Mr. Camdessus, who ranks Albania as the leader of post communist European countries.

Mr. Perry himself even considered his visit to Albania as the most important of his European tour. It was the longest visit of all the visits the U.S. defense secretary made to other countries, and it should be borne in mind

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that it was the second meeting within a few days that William Perry had had with Albanian political personalities.

Mr. Perry's visit and assessments, as a top-ranking official representing the United States, are not only a notable event in the friendly relations between our two countries, but also an important indication of the great U.S. interest in our country.

The fact that this representative, from a country considered to be the symbol of freedom, is highly appreciative of democratic developments in Albania, is of utmost significance. When the defense minister of the most powerful country in the world expresses his full support for Albania in all fields, Albanians are correct to look with full confidence toward their future.

This support, these positive assessments by international officials, are a result of the tangible reality of Albanian developments. Albania, emerging from total isolation and a monstrous dictatorship, its economy in shambles, has, beyond every optimistic expectation, overcome frightful hurdles in the economy, politics, and in the field of human rights. These words are not a demagogy, but a reality confirmed by everyday facts, a reality that is perceived by all political personalities visiting our country.

Such conclusions of course enrage those who are trying to besmirch everything that is being done in Albania; those who are going out of their way to present Albania in a grimmer light than under the dictatorship—let these conclusion serve them right. Let the desire and attempts of these "Albanians" to kill hope be confronted with the high esteem and support of foreign officials for Albania and democracy. However, in closing this chapter, we conclude by quoting the words of a foreign diplomat concerning Albania: "What matters most is that everything goes well."

Official Interviewed on Constitutional Delays

AU2607123094 Tirana GAZETA SHQIPTARE in Albanian 21 Jul 94 p 1

[Interview with Zef Brozi, chairman of the Supreme Court and member of the parliamentary Commission for the Draft Constitution, by Armand Mero in Tirana; date not given: "Brozi: I Want a Referendum. This Parliament Is Incapable of Producing a Constitution"]

[Text] Tirana—"I am pessimistic about the parliament of today being able to provide Albania with a new and dignified constitution." This was said by Zef Brozi, chairman of the Supreme Court and member of the parliamentary Commission for the preparation of the constitution, who, after making a new accusation, spoke of the problem that has, for several months now, become the epicenter of discussions and polemics among the Albanian parliamentary deputies. Even Prime Minister Meksi himself, at a special interpelation before the parliament, explained the reasons why the draft constitution has been delayed. "In actual fact," Brozi explained for GAZETA SHQIPTARE, "the draft constitution could have been discussed more quickly."

[Mero] What has impeded this then?

[Brozi] Debates on the constitution could have been carried out in time if all the commission members had been prepared to draft a modern and useful constitution. What we have noticed is the apparent tendency to attempt to satisfy personal whims through the forces of laws. Thus for example, the number one at the Supreme Court does not go down well with two or three judges of this court, and it has led to the disruption of their work for several months. This is unwarranted. The present chapter of the constitution has sparked off endless debates. Thus, at the beginning, the idea of not having a Constitutional Court at all was put forward, but it was abandoned. Then, the view was put forward according to which this Court should have less power than it has and that it should never oversee the parliament. This means that the Court will never have the power to annul laws, but just return them to the parliament for further discussion whenever it finds that they are in breach of one of the constitution's provisions.

[Mero] Has the existence of two different draft constitutions made matters worse?

[Brozi] It has complicated the work of the commission a lot and has often given rise to vain debates, even serving as a pretext for dragging on or postponing its meetings. As far as I am concerned, the first draft constitution, presented in January 1993, is infinitely better than the one brought in after some months, in June. This draft constitution realizes, in a concrete way, the division and interweaving of powers, thus preventing any possibility of making one power absolute at the expense of the other.

[Mero] When could the constitutional be ready?

[Brozi] I cannot speak of deadlines. The only thing I can say is that I do not see any objective hindrance to ending the Commission's debates on the draft constitution. However, I am pessimistic about our parliament's capability to find a language of understanding and provide Albania with a new and dignified constitution, one of the best among the constitutions of Eastern European countries, as its first variant in actual fact is.

[Mero] Why this pessimism?

[Brozi] I base it on the political climate that is not inclined to tolerance and understanding among political parties, which are the first prerequisite for the endorsement of a constitution. The first group of lawyers, who worked on the January draft constitution, after the few amendments made by the parliament, offered the parliament a splendid program. But it is only the technical side. The constitution as a political document needs the consent and support of all political forces. The tendency

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itself to try, for example, to define the competences of powers, by linking them to concrete names of certain political forces, is primitive psychology. When formulating legislation, we must have a law on powers that is not made for individual persons, but for Albania.

[Mero] What would be the procedure for its approval?

[Brozi] This is the most crucial point. I am for the approval of the constitution by all the people through a referendum, or at least by a Constitutional Assembly.

Constantinescu on Opposition Role in Reforms

AU2607195894 Tirana TVSH Television Network in Albanian 1800 GMT 26 Jul 94

[Interview with Emil Constantinescu, chairman of the Democratic Convention of Romania, by Tefta Radi in Tirana; date not given—recorded]

[Excerpt] [Radi] Mr. Constantinescu, as chairman of the Romanian opposition, can you tell us something about the role of the opposition in democratic processes and reform in Romania?

[Constantinescu] The democratic opposition played a very important role in the development of democratic processes and reform. We have very clearly expressed ourselves in favor of decentralization, the strengthening of the local administration's role based on financial autonomy, the development of medium and small enterprises, and the reorganization of large enterprises.

[Radi] How do you currently assess the democratic processes and the reform in your country?

[Constantinescu] Romania is progressing on a good road. We are on the right track, but it is slow going. We and trade unions are insisting that the reform be accelerated. [passage omitted]

Editorial Views Right-Wing Anticommunist Front

AU2607133394 Tirana E DJATHTA in Albanian 22 Jul 94 p 1

["Editorial": "The Right-Wing Anticommunist Front Was Institutionalized"]

[Text]

Declaration

On 19 July 1994, by the invitation of the chairmanship of the National Association of Confiscated Owners "Ownership and Justice," a meeting was organized, with the participation of this association's representatives and the representatives of the Right-Wing Democratic Party and the Party of Social Justice in order to institute the creation of the Right-Wing Anticommunist Front.

Discussions were held in a constructive spirit and in an atmosphere of complete understanding and good faith.

The representatives of the three participant parties:

—realizing that the initiative for the creation of the Right-Wing Anticommunist Front, declared on 1 January 1994 by the Shkodra section of the Association "Ownership and Justice", has earned extensive support throughout the country among the broad masses of former political prisoners and detainees, confiscated owners, nationalists, and democrats;

—realizing that the National Right-Wing Anticommunist Front has been proclaimed at the meeting of 3 April 1994;

—realizing the common desire and resolution to institute the creation of the Right-Wing Anticommunist Front;

—after unanimously agreeing that the Draft Platform presented by the Association "Ownership and Justice", published in the newspaper E DJATHTA and ATDHEU in red letters, correctly and fully reflects the organizational conditions and principles of the Right Wing Anticommunist Front, and clearly defines its goals, its role and its tasks,

DECIDED:

1. To institutionalize the Right-Wing Democratic Front, comprising the National Association of Confiscated Owners "Ownership and Justice", the Right-Wing Democratic Party and the Party of Social Justice.

2. To endorse the political and organizational platforms of the Right-Wing Anticommunist Front according to its draft, presented by the "Ownership and Justice" association, short of the request for the approval of the constitution being prepared, which is dealt with in Point No. 6 of the platform.

3. To set up the Coordinating Council of the Right-Wing Anticommunist Front, made up of two main leaders from each member organization.

4. To launch an appeal on all advocates of the foundation of the Right-Wing Anticommunist Front for further support for its institutionalization.

5. To carry out continued activities in order to popularize and strengthen the Right-Wing Anticommunist Front.

6. The Right-Wing Anticommunist Front is open to every right-wing political force willing to accept its platform and carry out activities concurrent with with the Right-Wing Anticommunist Front's goals and platform. Admission of new political subjects to the Front is made by common consent of the three founding organizations.

[Dated] Tirana, 19 July 1994

[Signed] For the Right-Wing Democratic Party: Petrit Kalakula, Abdi Baleta.

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For the National Association of Confiscated Owners "Ownership and Justice": Rrapo H. Danushi, Abedin Preza.

For the Party of Social Justice: Petrit Bidoshi, Xhavit Turkeshi.

Clarification

The newspaper LIRIA, dated 20 July 1994, adds an "editorial note" to the "Declaration of Anticommunist Organizations", stating that the representatives of the PDD [Right-Wing Democratic Party] and those of the Association "Ownership and Justice", have left the negotiation table on 13 July 1994. This note by no means reflects the truth and misinforms the reader. The meeting of 13 July 1994, as with the two previous ones, was presided over by Mr. Rrapo Hajredin Danushi, and after two hours of debates did not arrive at a decision. Realizing that the parties involved in the debates could not agree on the name given to their coalition, the meeting was usually closed. However, it turns out that the representatives of four political organizations have stayed on and organized a second meeting to formalize their stance. This meeting has nothing to do with the first one. Regarding the reasons this situation came about to begin with, we will state our view another time, whenever we deem it appropritate.

[Signed] The spokesmen of the PDD

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Finance Minister Discusses Inflation, Exchange

AU2307163594 Sofia DEMOKRATSIYA in Bulgarian 16 Jul 94 p 5

[Interview with Finance Minister Stoyan Aleksandrov by Polina Mikhaylova; place and date not given: "The Economy Will Show Whether the Foreign Debt Deal Is a Good One"]

[Excerpt] [Passage omitted] [Mikhaylova] There is much talk that you want to impose controls on the foreign exchange market and intend, as finance minister, to apply the Yugoslav ploy of closing down the central bank. What do you say to this?

[Aleksandrov] I have no such intentions. We have to prepare a package of preventive measures, even unpopular ones, to prevent a second shock on the foreign exchange market. We cannot claim that our foreign exchange regime is the best possible. It is good for Switzerland or Germany, who possess developed market mechanisms and where the institutions and bodies involved behave normally. In Bulgaria, many of the actions by the banks and those involved in the market are without logic, and the standard of control is poor. If we are a stable state and can analyze all the foreign currency deposits, if the holder of the deposit cannot prove the origin of his foreign currency (showing, for example, that he has converted a leva deposit into foreign currency, while he is only entitled to exchange 10,000 leva for travel purposes), then such persons should be fined under the Law on Foreign Currency Deals and Valuables. The smallest fine is a tax contribution. People will ask me why I did not do this immediately, seeing that I am responsible for ensuring the implementation of the Law on Foreign Currency Deals and Valuables. Our citizens believe that we will not resort to such unpopular measures. It is the same with the merchants: They are not entitled to purchase foreign currency freely, it can only be purchased for a specific deal. This is also a violation of the law. If we only exercised this control, we could put a stop to the outbursts, panic, and displays of emotion that have a snowball effect in weakening the lev. Should an extreme situation develop, we will have to assess whether a further devaluation of the lev is necessary, in addition to what happened two or three months ago. Someone may ask whether the lev should not be exchanged at the rate of 100 to 120 to the dollar. First, we must use the existing possibilities of influencing the foreign exchange market. Second, we should have measures ready for speedy intervention to counter the first signs of a possible shock. These are merely ideas, not categorical intentions. I do not want to go back on what we have already achieved, but if it becomes necessary.... The state commercial banks must be controlled, because the state is the principal shareholder. Our great problem is that we have given them too much of a free rein.

[Mikhaylova] Bulgaria is taking out new loans to pay back the old ones, and is entering an endless spiral. How can we escape from this situation?

[Aleksandrov] At the moment, we are drafting with the IMF and the World Bank major measures relating to structural reform. The FESAL [Finance and Economy Structural Adjustment Loan] program also represents a set of tools of this kind. They relate to privatization issues, control over loss-making enterprises, and problems in the banking sector. The international financial institutions are extremely worried about the state of the banking sector, especially about the condition of a number of banks. The second serious issue is the instability of the lev and lack of confidence in it. Even the old communist textbooks state that the main factors promoting high inflation are an unstable economic situation and lack of confidence in the government and parliament. In Bulgaria, the lev's decreasing value and the high prices result from political instability. No one can deny this, it is only possible to depreciate its importance. We must stabilize the political situation to some extent, which would provide a guarantee for completing a radical structural reform. For this one needs political will. This is the delicate situation of the present cabinet, which lacks the support of any clearly legitimized political force able to assume the political responsibility. One counts on the government succeeding in convincing the majority of the deputies in the various parliamentary groups that they should support it in implementing some unpopular measures. It is the worst possible situation when a government wavers from side to side and struggles to push something through. Then, the effect produced is not very good, and this is the big problem that greatly worries me personally.

[Mikhaylova] One of the sharpest comments made by the IMF mission related to the high rate of inflation in Bulgaria. It is well-known that this is a good way to finance the balance of payments. The country faces the risk of hyperinflation, and confidence in the lev is very low. What is your reaction?

[Aleksandrov] The situation is not properly understood. The IMF is interested in the budget deficit and the money supply, not in inflation and the exchange rate. What we are trying to do now is to control inflation, therefore income policy is the big problem. We must decide whether to keep to the present policy, because, although some of are citizens are in a very difficult situation, this is the lesser evil. If we surrender to populism and increase incomes even by a little, we will enter an inflationary spiral. The summer months are easier, and I would recommend that most of these payments should be made in the fourth quarter, when people need money the most. In my view, we must pay serious attention to social assistance and helping the socially disadvantaged, and stop having regard for the average Bulgarian as a statistical value. I want to fight against the existing trend to bring everyone down to the same level, to enable the budget revenues to be distributed among those in real need. If our state can have a great football team, it can have a good economy in the same way.

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Podkrepa Leader Meets Berov, Makes Allegations

AU2607175094 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1600 GMT 26 Jul 94

[Text] At the Council of Ministers building, Prime Minister Lyuben Berov has just completed a meeting with Konstantin Trenchev, president of the Podkrepa Labor Confederation. Here is Kalina Stancheva with the details.

[Stancheva] Dr. Trenchev handed Prime Minister Berov an open letter from the Podkrepa Labor Confederation demanding that a parliamentary and governmental commission be set up to investigate the archives of the Bulgarian National Bank [BNB] where, according to Dr. Trenchev, accounts of the Reichsbank have not been closed. He said that the accounts relate to a German debt to Bulgaria incurred in 1945, valued at $750 million.

Speaking as a professor and an economist, Berov expressed the view that Germany had discharged its debt in deliveries of military equipment, but that the information offered by Podkrepa deserved attention. Dr. Trenchev insisted on forming a commission. The prime minister also made a commitment to try to help in connection with the transport strike in Turgovishte.

We also discussed the affair involving Evgeni Angelov, Dr. Trenchev said on leaving the meeting. He said that he demanded that Angelov be dismissed from his post of deputy chairman of the Committee on Power Supply. The president of Podkrepa also promised to provide the prime minister with the documents relating to the offer to supply coal from Venezuela, and invited the government's lawyers to state their view on them. At the same time, Podkrepa will ensure that the prosecution service investigates Evgeni Angelov in connection with other facts that Dr. Trenchev promised to make public on Thursday [28 July].

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Vaclav Havel on Central Europe, NATO, Russia

94CH0348A Krakow TYGODNIK POWSZECHNY in Polish 26 Jun 94 pp 1, 5

[Interview with Vaclav Havel, president of the Czech Republic, by Jacques Rupnik, French historian and political scientist and an associate of the Center for International Studies and Research in Paris, in Prague on 19 April: "We Constitute a Single Whole"]

[Text] [Rupnik] A new map of Europe has been taking shape since the Cold War ended. By now the concept of East Europe is practically meaningless and, at most, applies to Russia, but the problem of the Balkans and Central Europe as an intersection of political interests is returning. Do not you fear the emergence of a kind of "no-man's land" between the East and the West?

[Havel] This question is being pondered not just by me alone. In some countries, it is being worded even more plainly than in ours—for example, in Poland, owing to its bitter historical experience with Russia and Germany.... The old and quite unnatural bipolar view of a divided Europe is no longer viable. We all rejoice over this, but we cannot dispense with a new order. And, unless democrats conceive and introduce that new order, the risk exists that it will be done by others: chauvinists, nationalists, and populists of all hues. This has to be prevented.

That is why, in my public speeches, I quite often emphasize the shared responsibility of the West for a new order, especially in Europe. Some problems concern the position of the countries of Central Europe. Everything indicates that the consensus of their publics and political leaders, regardless of whether they consider themselves leftist or rightist, is that Central Europe is a specific part of Europe as such, construed as a kind of cultural, spiritual, and political tradition that is nowadays represented by the West.

In contrast, they do not feel themselves to be part of the Russian sphere of interests, its "near abroad," and they are worried by certain notes that have recently begun to be sounded in Russian foreign policy to the effect that some special relations should exist between us and Russia. This strongly implies the threat of a renewed division [of Europe], and, therefore, we find it unacceptable.

[Rupnik] How do you view the situation in the Balkans? What does the current war in Bosnia mean to Central Europe, along with the fact that the borders of countries are changing in accordance with ethnic criteria?

[Havel] I believe that, in the former Yugoslavia, the point is not a trivial local disturbance, a conflict among ethnic groups. The fighting there is for fundamental European values. The entire integrative process is linked to the idea of the civic state and civic society, to the idea of coexistence of people of various ethnic origin, of various creeds and cultures. Consent to the idea of a purely ethnic state means, properly speaking, a denial of these fundamental values on which European integration is based.

During the peace negotiations, the military draws up various maps prepared on the basis of their actual battlefield successes and on which or what village has been "ethnically cleansed" by self-styled armies. This is happening on the territory of a country recognized by the international community and one that is a UN member. The West is engaging in serious negotiations with these caciques and genuinely believes that the road to peace consists in reaching a compromise among these maps of the various parties to the conflict. But that is totally absurd.

We Czechs have particularly strong feelings about this because it reminds us of how Hitler drew up a map of Europe and how the Western democracies had acquiesced to it, supposedly in the interest of peace. So what happened afterward? The war broke out anyway, and it was a thousand times more horrible and devoured a thousandfold more victims than if the West had proved more resolute in the past and at least adhered to its obligations. Yes, there exists a parallel with the Munich Pact, to which Western democracies remain inclined for many reasons (which you as a political scientist could certainly name). This is one of the threats to democracy.

Certain signs of such a "Munich" approach can be perceived in Europe's attitude toward the crisis in Bosnia. Recently, the international community "showed its claws" by threatening air raids and even carrying out a few. But right afterward it became scared, as it were, and suddenly they started to say that the Serbian offensive against Gorazde should be a major argument for starting talks on the abolition of the embargo for the new Yugoslavia. This is utterly absurd because the impression arises that the harder someone fights, slaughters, and "ethnically cleanses" the civilian population, the more respectfully his demands must be met.

[Rupnik] Don't you think that this is also dangerous to others? If Europe acknowledges that boundaries can be reshaped by violence according to ethnic criteria, does this not threaten the other Balkan countries, Central Europe, and especially Russia, considering that 25 million Russians live outside the boundaries of that country?

[Havel] This threat does exist, but so do others. Unless the happenings in Yugoslavia are resolutely halted and the continuing seepage of that poison stopped, the danger arises that other countries will be drawn into the conflict. New spheres of interest will spontaneously arise: the Western world, with Germany predominant, linked to Croatia; the Russian world, linked to Serbia; and the Islamic world, linked to the Muslims. This is a veritable dragon seed and, within a few years, could lead to a major confrontation. As such, this is another reason the international community should take a resolute stand against aggressive nationalism. Otherwise, we all

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could be sucked into the eddy of the most sinister ambitions and geopolitical passions.

[Rupnik] The West is reacting positively to the return of Russian influence in the Balkans because, as a result, the Serbs have been making some concessions. But how do you view the situation in Russia itself? The West is engaging in a major debate on the direction in which Russia is evolving and on how to cooperate with it. President Clinton supports the idea of a so-called "mature partnership," but recently, in an article in FOREIGN AFFAIRS (published simultaneously in issue No. 10, 1994, of TYGODNIK POWSZECHNY—T.P. Editor's note), Zbigniew Brzezinski opposed this idea with rather pessimistic vision of the situation in Russia, especially as regards that country's return to big-power policy as embodied in the concept of the so-called near abroad, and termed it "a premature partnership," meaning not so much "immature" as "unripe partnership."

I do not believe it to be premature. On the contrary, I fear that it is by now too late. It may be that there existed a moment between 1991, the year of the USSR's collapse, and 1992, the year when not only Russia withdrew from its former colonies but also there existed a window of opportunity for its linkage to some international cooperation. So then, "mature" or "premature" partnership, or is it already too late?

[Havel] You are echoing the justified alarm being raised in our part of Europe, the incessant outcries for the West to realize the gravity of the situation. Had more attention been paid in 1990 to these perhaps sometimes too romantic but still understandable outcries from our part of Europe for taking new steps in a new situation, something might have been prevented. But, as we know, in history there is hardly any point to pondering "What If" because history simply happens, and we cannot test other alternatives on it.

At present, the idea of the partnership seems warranted to me. But it has to be a genuine partnership. A genuine partnership means total openness, sincere expression of opinions. But, if we are to interpret partnership as making concessions to the partner's whims, then, in my opinion, this is no partnership. On the one hand, good and peaceful relations and cooperation have to be built between the West and Russia, but, on the other, Russia should be made aware that such a partnership does not signify consent to everything.

As regards the so-called near abroad, meaning the former republics of the USSR, an interesting comment was made by President Shevardnadze, who had fairly recently paid me a visit. He stated that it would be a mistake to treat the Commonwealth of Independent States [CIS] as a mere instrument for Russian hegemony in that region; it should also be viewed as an instrument for controlling Russia. In his opinion, processes should be created and promoted within the CIS that would at the same time regulate the eventual expansionism or Great Russian ambitions that for obvious reasons are currently beginning to surface in Russian policy.

The collapse of the bipolar world, the collapse of the mighty Soviet empire and afterward also of the USSR, is certainly viewed by the Russian soul (noncommunist as well) as a defeat, a wound, a tragedy. And, because the vast transformation in Russia is a thousandfold more difficult and painful than, say, in the Czech Republic [CR], that suffering and wounded soul needs to be in some way consoled. That is why politicians want to restore national pride. But that is a pseudoproposal, pseudopride, because, instead of winning authority by promoting domestic changes and a peace-loving foreign policy, certain Russian politicians want to win it by demonstrations of strength vis-a-vis other countries.

[Rupnik] To the West, the priorities are quite clear. First, Russia is a nuclear power with which an agreement has to be reached; otherwise, things will be bad for both Central Europe and the West. Second, the conflict in the Balkans has to be halted, and the Macedonian problem should be isolated so as not to embroil Greece and Turkey—NATO members—because that would be a dangerous shock to NATO. But, because there is no direct threat to Central Europe, extending NATO membership to that part of Europe at present is not a big priority to the West. Well, the view from Central Europe is different.

[Havel] Because we view these matters conversely. If there is shooting somewhere, that is a priority. The reasons for the shooting should be determined, and it should be stopped, however, both there and everywhere else. This should be a priority.

The values the West defends and wants to defend are a priority because they underlie everything else. Accordingly, these values should be propagated in the countries that accept them and prove that they have assimilated them; a corresponding attitude toward the Balkan conflict and a corresponding kind of relations and talks with Russia are a corollary. Any reversal of these priorities is quite absurd because it means that unessential matters come before essential ones.

[Rupnik] Central Europe is, properly speaking, a victim of its own success. It is relatively stable and fairly prosperous, and, hence, at least from the West's point of view, it faces no direct threat. Therefore, the West is asking what the hurry [about joining NATO] is.

[Havel] In other words, if Czechoslovakia had not been split peacefully, if a war had broken out between Czechs and Slovaks, we would have become a priority. We are not a priority because this did not happen.

[Rupnik] Of course, you would not have become a priority. On the contrary, [NATO] would say, "We cannot admit them because of the war there."

[Havel] We would have been a priority in the sense that the West would say, "There is shooting in the center of

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Europe, moreover, so we must pay special attention to them." But don't we deserve such attention just because there is no shooting in our region?

[Rupnik] Why is it that the countries of Central Europe desire membership in NATO so greatly? And what do they expect of NATO? For the time being, NATO is proposing "Partnership for Peace." But what can it mean, and what would be the purpose of such a partnership with NATO and simultaneously with Russia?

[Havel] I think that the idea of the Partnership for Peace is not a bad beginning. Everything depends on how it will be pursued. I would consider it meaningful if it indeed made possible a differentiated approach to different countries. This means: Russia is a big Eurasian power with nuclear weaponry and, moreover, with a gravitational center in a somewhat different culture of its own. Of course, this does not at all mean that its culture is worse; it is not a question of valuation. It simply is a different culture, just as South America, Africa, and Southeast Asia all have different cultures.

Partnership between the West and that superpower is naturally bound to be of a different nature from partnership with the little CR, which evidently belongs in the Western civilizational domain, a republic that in the event of a major conflict is incapable of defending itself and that necessarily must have security links and shares Western values and therefore wants to be part of the Western community.

I held a fairly long conversation on this subject with Minister Kozyrev during his visit to Hradcany Castle. I tried to explain to him that Russia cannot both be a big power and desire all the rights available to the small countries of Central Europe. If we aspire to become part of some community, that is something clearly different from the aspirations of Russia to join the same community.

Suppose Russia wants to become a member of NATO. Would that nuclear power agree to some joint command's dictating to it where to deploy and how to use its troops? After all, it would never consent to anything like that. It wants to remain a big power. And, if that is so, there are no grounds for Mr. Kozyrev's arguing "Why is it that you can but we cannot?" After all, Russia cannot want the same thing that we, a small nonnuclear country of Central Europe, want.

Russia's relations with the West have to be established on a completely different level, as an accord for partnership between two colossi, while the small countries can afterward, in accordance with their cultural traditions, join whichever community they want to join and where they feel they traditionally belong. It may be that Kazakhstan or Tajikistan would rather feel itself an element of an Eastern, Russian gravitational field, whereas we feel we belong in the Western field. This is a matter to be decided upon by the individual countries. Similarly, it is the business of Ukraine and Belarus to decide which community they will ultimately join. During his visit to Prague, President Clinton declared, "We shall not erect a new Iron Curtain on the Polish-Ukrainian border or the Ukrainian-Russian border." It is natural for every country to decide on its own where it wants to be.

[Rupnik] Should Russia join NATO, this would transform the Alliance into a collective security organization. Henry Kissinger once said, "If everybody guarantees the security of everybody else, this means that no one guarantees anything."

[Havel] Yes, that is the fate encountered by the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). The idea that everybody should be everywhere is hardly a good idea. I know of several international communities that collapsed because they were so accommodating as to admit any applicant country and thus became impotent and inoperative.

[Rupnik] Because you mentioned President Clinton's visit, I must say that, in a sense, it showed that cooperation among Central European countries themselves, also in the domain of security, is not quite evident, that it is beset by certain problems. To be sure, these countries have much in common regarding their attitude toward the Balkans and Russia, but can they jointly negotiate with NATO?

[Havel] There are two sides to it. On the one hand, there is the quite natural and justified dislike of our being treated indiscriminately because we still have strong memories of the Warsaw Pact. Our countries have been independent for only a short period of time, for barely four years, and thus we, especially the Czech Government, are allergic when somebody treats the Central European countries as if they were a single whole because then our identities are obliterated.

On the other hand, no country can survive without good relations with its neighbors. We are and shall remain neighbors. In the past, we failed to live in harmony and almost always had to pay a high price for it. Thus, we must find a way of cooperating well, and whoever thinks it unimportant is mistaken.

[Rupnik] Such cooperation was mentioned during the recent meeting of seven presidents of the countries of Central Europe in Litomysl. All of the participants praised your idea of an informal meeting, but some journalists thought it produced no practical effects in the form of a joint declaration.

[Havel] At Litomysl, the point was the meeting itself rather than regular diplomatic talks. This project was to promote the creation of a benign climate for good-neighbor relations. Its significance and, hence, also its effects can be clear only if we understand the importance of symbols in politics.

First symbol: Precisely at a time when some people in Russia say that the countries of Central Europe should

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not join NATO, these countries are jointly becoming a specific but integral part of the Western world.

The next symbol is that, from Slovenia to Poland, we as a region are able to talk together and explore the possibilities for cooperation. Thus, it is not correct to suspect some countries (including the CR) of having a contemptuous attitude toward their neighbors and wanting to join the West and leave the neighbors to their fate. That would be a shortsighted and an unpromising policy. I think that, for example, it is quite unlikely for NATO to admit the CR but not Poland because, from the geopolitical point of view, Poland is a much more important factor.

This does not mean that cooperation within Central Europe makes sense only as regards coordinating actions vis-a-vis the West. In that respect, the situation from Visegrad to Litomysl has changed. Now, representatives of two member countries of the European Union and of countries until recently defined as postcommunist have been talking as equal partners.

The last symbol concerns Germany. We are and shall remain neighbors. All of the countries are building anew their relations with Germany, just as the Germans do with them. Without good relations with that country, we cannot gain membership in Western institutions, but, at the same time, we are no German sphere of interest. The meeting at Litomysl took place in the CR and at our invitation.

[Rupnik] NATO faces altogether three problems: First, it is exploring a new formula now that the Cold War has ended; second, it does not want to isolate Russia because that is a nuclear power; and last, it is knocking at the doors of Central Europe. How would NATO solve these three problems?

[Havel] My impression is that none of these problems can be solved separately and that, properly speaking, they compose a single problem. I would call it the identity problem of the Alliance [NATO].

NATO must decide what it wants to become in a situation that is diametrically opposed to what has existed since its establishment. On this decision hinges its attitude toward Central Europe and Russia. In my opinion, NATO should explicitly declare that it is a community of democratic European countries professing clearly stated values. It should rapidly open itself to the countries meeting this requirement—hence, also the CR—and define itself as a European rather than just a West European organization. This would clarify the next issue: It should, of course, open itself in our direction. This, in its turn, answers the last question.

It should be clearly stated that, yes, we constitute a single whole, in whose vital interest (and in the interest of the entire world) it is to cohabit optimally with another great whole—namely, Russia and those countries that are attracted to the Russian gravitational field--and, as such, we should build relations of genuine partnership with that other whole.

Prime Minister Remarks on Progress of Reforms

LD2607181094 Prague Radiozurnal Radio Network in Czech 1618 GMT 26 Jul 94

["Regular" weekly interview with Czech Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus by correspondent Lucie Weissova; place and date not given—recorded]

[Excerpt] [Passage omitted] [Weissova] In connection with the visit of Margaret Thatcher, discussions have emerged on conservatism and its place in our country. Although there are no differences between you and the former British prime minister as to the point of view, you are accused that in practice you are much more (?socialist) than appropriate for a conservative politician. The initial speed of the reforms has slowed down, and the government is liberalizing some spheres of life very slowly and timidly—for example, regulation of wages and rents. What would you say to this criticism?

[Klaus] I do not agree with it in principle. I see nothing in which the speed of economic reforms will be slowed down. On the contrary, the economic reform—that is, the part that can be ordered and organized by the state—is behind us, and, unfortunately, there are no steps that we could advocate with the same speed and initiative. We are now moving in a completely different world, and a reformist politician cannot be a radical. Now the point is completely different.

I do not think that our liberalization is slow. I am quite sure that the liberalization of prices in the Czech economy is fully comparable with how prices were liberalized in the majority of European countries 10 years ago—that is, 40 years after the war. It is also comparable with how prices are being liberalized in some countries in the Europe of today. So the criticism that in Hong Kong and the United States things are more liberal finds infertile ground and, unfortunately, comes from the same people, from those who at one time were saying that liberalization was too radical. Now, because they have nothing else to criticize, they say that we are doing it too slowly. [passage omitted]

KDS Head on Speculation About ODA Merger

AU2607174994 Prague LIDOVE NOVINY in Czech 25 Jul 94 p 3

[Article by "(ljd)": "According to Pilip, No One Is Capable of Assuming the Role of the Civic Democratic Party at the Moment"]

[Text] Prague—Christian Democratic Party [KDS] Chairman Ivan Pilip has aired his views to LIDOVE NOVINY on the speculation about the propensity toward a merger between the KDS and the Civic Democratic Alliance [ODA]. "No one has yet said anything to

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me along these lines. Of course, various proposals and postulations are emerging; however, so far, no conversation has even gone as far as the form of unofficial discussions," said Pilip.

"This is July 1994. There are almost two years to go until the parliamentary elections. Therefore, specific steps toward a merger are very premature. Nevertheless, further crystallization on the right of the political spectrum is to be expected. This will proceed along with an increase in the credibility of allegiance to political tendencies to the detriment of today's often merely declarative logos," continued the KDS chairman. He explained that the KDS will monitor its partners carefully in specific issues—for example, in their attitudes toward retirement. "Such factors betray real political orientation more than formal external symbols and proclamations."

According to Pilip, the coming local elections will convey something about the ideological composition of the parties and, thus, also about the prospects for a merger. "We are not rejecting any of the potential options," continued Pilip. He added that he can envisage a kind of integration process for the future. He admitted that there may exist within ODA a more conservatively oriented part of the membership dissatisfied with the Alliance's ideological ambiguity that would be glad to strengthen its position by a merger with the KDS. "Our right wing would become better arranged and more attractive to the voters if its division into conservative and liberal parts were asserted more fundamentally. So far, this dividing line is being drawn within the coalition parties—first and foremost, within the civic parties."

Pilip also confirmed the statement made by Vaclav Klaus about the very good relations between the Civic Democratic Party [ODS] and the KDS. "I have to say one thing with regard to the ODS: It is possible to have considerable reservations about a number of its steps. However, in principle, the ODS is in the role of the party with the most responsibility. No one is capable of assuming this role from the ODS at the moment." In Pilip's opinion, a survey of preelection support from which the ODS was excluded would reveal something interesting about the distribution of moods and attitudes.

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Welcome for Israel-Jordan Accord

LD2607195394 Bratislava STV 1 Television Network in Slovak 1730 GMT 26 Jul 94

[Excerpt] The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic welcomes with pleasure the declaration ending the state of war and stating the principles of gradual normalization of mutual relations between the Kingdom of Jordan and the State of Israel. The ministry considers the ending of the state of war between the two countries, which lasted almost half a century, and the signing of this document as another positive step toward an overall peaceful settlement between Israel and the Arab countries. [passage omitted]

Meciar Praises Klaus for Facilitating Sovereignty

AU2607175594 Bratislava SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA (HZDS Supplement) in Slovak 21 Jul 94 pp i, iv

[Address by Vladimir Meciar, chairman of the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS), on the occasion of the second anniversary of the Declaration of Sovereignty of the Slovak Republic on 17 July; place not given: "...And the Worlds Will Envy Us!"]

[Excerpts] By declaring sovereignty, the freely and democratically elected Slovak National Council let all of the other states, nations, and governments know that the Slovaks are taking their fate in their own hands, that they want and are able to create their own state, and that they want to live on an equal basis with other nations and states. [passage omitted]

The Declaration of Sovereignty was a decision that objectively ripened, and the international conditions were also ripe. Not in the year 2000 but right at that moment, it was necessary to take these steps. Many people understand that they could not have been taken now—and, if then, with tremendous sacrifices. A lot of courage was needed then, and we drew it from the trust of the people. For the first time in history, the Slovaks had a representation that did not fail them. It was willing to assume and bear the responsibility for its steps. Unity was attained between the citizens and their political representatives, who sat down with their Czech partners and sought solutions. It was not a simple task for either side. The way we arrived at our sovereignty and statehood has not been reprised anywhere else. In other countries, it is accompanied by conflicts, the loss of lives, suffering, and great material losses. We have avoided all this.

Allow me to take this opportunity to express my appreciation also to those who sat at the other end of the table who made this development possible. It was, above all, the personality of Czech Vaclav Klaus who proved himself to be the greatest of Czech politicians. He comprehended that the Slovaks would not be deterred. He was the first to understand the historical context and the necessity of this decision. When they still wanted to threaten me, Vaclav Klaus sought a way of creating two states in a cultured and dignified manner, with all due respect. We managed to find such a way.

A lot is being said today regarding our readiness for such a step. The degree of readiness is gauged by the level of intellectual, national, cultural, and economic maturity. The Slovaks, however, actually surpassed the stage of maturity for this step. Others ask whether our decision was a democratic one. We reply that we obtained our authorization in the elections. There were 89 deputies in the Slovak National Council who received the mandate to take this step. Many people pointed out the damages, while we pointed to the advantages brought to us by the independence and the benefits gained by being able to make decisions ourselves.

In 18 months, Slovakia passed through a stage of development that takes other nations possibly decades. After the independent state emerged, it became obvious that our opponents were wrong, as 127 states recognized us immediately. It was a rocket start to international life. The world recognized the culture of our execution of the demise of the federation. They told us that we will oppress the national minority. We did not want to be the overlords of anyone. We have always wanted friendship and understanding with all minorities. We want the protection of their rights but want to neither divide the territory of Slovakia nor create language barriers. We want harmony in our relations because we all live on the territory of a single state. The Slovak Republic is the homeland of us all.

Many people predicted an economic disaster after the independent state emerged, and this did not happen. It did not happen because the citizens accepted the state for their own. If they reproach us that there was no referendum, we reply that the election is coming. It is true that those who did not want our independence are in power now, but it is our conviction that civic society will make it right. It is our internal affair; it must not become an international affair. If we declared in Article 2 of the Constitution that the people are the only source of power and government in this state, it meant free and sovereign people—the people who have our thanks and esteem for choosing us and letting us take this step.

Let me conclude this address with the words of a poet who characterized our future in one of his poems thusly: "...and the worlds will envy us."

Moravcik on Support for DU, Privatization Issues

AU2607125494 Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak 22 Jul 94 p 2

[Interview with Slovak Prime Minister Jozef Moravcik by Martin Hric; place and date not given: "Jozef Moravcik on Party Support and the Power Generation and Gas Industries"]

[Text] While electoral support for the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS] and the popularity of its chairman, Vladimir Meciar, are almost the same, the

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situation within the recently established Democratic Union [DU] is different: It has 7 percent support, and its chairman lies third in the popularity stakes, with 16 percent support. We asked Jozef Moravcik whether he was concerned about the reason for this difference:

[Moravcik] Yes, certainly. I think the reason for this is that the DU, a few weeks after its establishment, has still not managed to become fixed in the minds of our citizens. In a poll conducted two months ago, 49 percent of respondents did not know what DU is. On the other hand, my name is perhaps also being linked to other political entities, such as the Social Democrats or the Democratic Party.

[Hric] Could another reason not also be the fact that the HZDS is a movement with a single dominant leader, while you have more personalities?

[Moravcik] I do not think so. More personalities should appeal to more voters.

[Hric] Would it not be appropriate for you to appear more forceful and more populist in the preelection campaign?

[Moravcik] Populism, to say nothing of aggression, runs counter to our philosophy. The situation is made more difficult for us in the sense that we are facing three tasks at once: to create the party's structure, to conduct a preelection campaign, and, in particular, to fulfill the tasks we have set ourselves in government. Each of these activities requires undivided attention.

[Hric] Are the government and DU not losing points by the privatization of the power generation and gas industries? Many experts are arguing strongly against this, while the arguments in favor are not very convincing.

[Moravcik] In the power-generating industry, the issue involves Mochovce exclusively, where we will not proceed further without the participation of foreign capital; it would not go into a state nuclear power plant. In the case of the gas industry, the issue does not at all involve the gas line and the pipes. The percentage for privatization is represented by the underground storage tanks and some service facilities.

[Hric] It would be necessary to explain this to the people, however?!

[Moravcik] I agree. We have to pay more attention to this.

Timetable for Processing Election Results

LD2607152194 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 1000 GMT 26 Jul 94

[Text] The Slovak electoral cauldron is slowly but surely beginning to boil. In this situation, the following piece of news from the Statistical Office of the Slovak Republic is not insignificant. The office says it considers the processing of election results a serious and prestigious event to which it will devote appropriate attention.

The definitive ranking of political parties and movements will be known on Sunday, 2 October, at noon and the exact names of deputies elected to the National Council on Tuesday, 4 October, in the evening.

The above was announced by Pavol Husar, the official in charge of the statistical processing of election results. The definitive election results will, however, be published by the Slovak Electoral Commission in cooperation with the Statistical Office of the Slovak Republic and the regional election commissions.

Husar also stressed that the Statistical Office of the Slovak Republic would process the election results in a correct manner, in a way that would reflect the voters' intentions. He added, however, that the situation could be complicated by the staging of a referendum on the day of the elections. This would not affect the central office but would affect the local and district election commissions. The Statistical Office proposed, therefore, that the referendum be held at a different time than simultaneously with the parliamentary elections.

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Defense Minister Keleti Views Finances, Tasks

AU2607160794 Budapest MAGYAR HIRLAP in Hungarian 25 Jul 94 p 3

[Interview with Hungarian Defense Minister Gyorgy Keleti by Janos Desi; place and date not given: "The Hundreds of Millions Should Not Have Been Spent on Officers' Uniforms"]

[Excerpts] [Passage omitted] [Desi] You have only been a minister for a few days and you have had to give a number of interviews on the necessary reductions in the Defense Ministry. Have you come here as a liquidation expert?

[Keleti] I have come here to be a politician. Of course, it is no harm having knowledge of liquidations, either. [passage omitted] I learned at the last moment that [Former Defense Minister] Lajos Fur had requested 2.5 billion forints at the caretaker government's last session. I thought that the previous government had actually promised this sum. Since then, it has come to light that it had only acknowledged the request. I do not think that the army will ever receive this money. According to certain indications, the previous leadership used up the reserves. For example, 70 percent of the annual sum for awards—around 30 million forints—was spent by them. [passage omitted]

[Desi] The leaders of other ministries could also complain about the lack of money.

[Keleti] Maybe. However, the national renewal program of the former government stated that enough money would be supplied for the army's operation. However, the government was not even able to repay the extra expenses arising from the measures in connection with the South Slav [Yugoslav] crisis.

[Desi] What will people say in your electoral district if they hear that there is less money for health care or education because the minister lobbied successfully to buy some new tanks?

[Keleti] In my electoral district and in other places, too, people know that the country's security is very important. I am certain they would not protest against the conscripted soldiers getting better food or staying at places with sanitary conditions typical of the 20th century. The citizens also know about the low pay of regular staff. They must also be aware of the fact that the army is still needed and this costs money. Undoubtedly, this army cannot be financed the way it has been—a new structure and reduced staffing is needed.

[Desi] Presumably, all your predecessors promised restructuring.

[Keleti] Forming the defense structure is a responsibility of the minister, the government, and Parliament. Therefore, I will inform Parliament about the army's situation at the end of the year. The deputies have to be clear about the future consequences of their budget decision, and the army's medium- and long-term development plan will have to be submitted to Parliament in 1995. It is necessary to adjust to the new circumstances.

[Desi] You did not become a minister easily. Supposedly the Alliance of Free Democrats [SZDSZ] was not keen on having a professional soldier as defense minister, which is not a practice in the civil democratic countries.

[Keleti] I indeed wore a uniform for 28 years but, in that time, I was only a "real" soldier who gives commands of "right turn" and "left turn" for three years. I carried out political functions the rest of the time.

[Desi] I imagine that this might have been the other objection against you.

[Keleti] From 1980, I dealt with the media, this was the period when the army gradually became open to the press. This is something quite democratic.

[Desi] According to the news, the chiefs of staff were concerned about you because you had not been a real soldier.

[Keleti] You see, they either object because I was a soldier of because I was not. As a minister, I want to be a politician. As for the SZDSZ's antagonistic feelings, the media exaggerated them. I have very good relations with the SZDSZ and with Imre Mecs who leads the Defense Committee. [passage omitted]

[Desi] During the Nemeth government, when the Defense Ministry's leadership was separated from that of the chiefs of staff, many people believed that this was necessary because, even if control over the Defense Ministry was to be lost at the free elections, influence over the army would be kept through the old guard in the chiefs of staff. Now, after the victory of the Hungarian Socialist Party [MSZP], you want to merge the two organizations again.

[Keleti] The institutions were indeed separated in December 1989. However, this was necessary in order to make the army, a national institution, independent of politics. And this is correct, because in a multiparty democracy where the party politicians keep changing at the heads of ministries, the army has to remain politically independent. This has so far been successful. The former government made a decision to unite the two establishments, but we are very likely to overrule this so the chiefs of staff and the Defense Ministry will remain separate.

[Desi] The president of the republic is the chief commander of the armed forces. What kind of relations do you expect to have with him?

[Keleti] I have met the president of the republic. We agreed that I would visit him once a month and inform him about the army's situation. The chief commander needs the information. I invite the leader of the president's military office to all cabinet sessions of the Defense Ministry. I would like the president to visit the

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military units regularly also, to gain personal experience and form personal relations. [passage omitted]

[Desi] Does the South Slav crisis mean any danger to Hungary for which the army should prepare?

[Keleti] Yes. It is possible for irregular troops to strike across the border. It is mainly the border guard's task to act against these, but the army might also be needed in a given situation. On the other hand, the air defense has to protect the country's airspace through reconnaissance and patrolling.

[Desi] You met your Slovak counterpart on 23 July. Will these kinds of discussions be regular?

[Keleti] I hope so. On 30 July, I am hoping to shake hands with the Romanian minister in Gyula [southeast Hungary]. I would like to meet the defense ministers of all countries in this area. This is very important for mutual trust and cooperation.

New Military Counterintelligence Head Named

AU2707120994 Budapest NEPSZAVA in Hungarian 26 Jul 94 p 2

[Unattributed report: "The Leader of Military Counterintelligence Will Be a Professional—The Coalition Has Agreed on Stefan"]

[Text] The Military Security Office [KBH], the Army's counterintelligence service, will soon have a new leader. Colonel Geza Stefan is the successor to retiring Major General Karoly Gyaraki.

Colonel Stefan, an expert in this area, has been working in this field for almost 20 years in various positions, therefore, his career has not been known to the public. Before the change of regime, the military counterintelligence operated as Department IV of the Main Department III. After completing the Military Academy, Stefan immediately started to work for Department III/IV around 1966 or 1967. This is where he acquired his scientific degrees. Around 1987, he began employment with the Interior Ministry, he was the leader of the department for organizing science. Here he supervised the education of future Interior Ministry officers. From this, he progressed to be the deputy head of the Budapest Police Headquarters [BRFK] state security department, he participated in supervising all counterintelligence work in Budapest. After 1990, he was the regional director of the National Security Office which, like the former state security department, is a county-level organization. At the moment, he is working for the economic and computer main directorate of the National Police headquarters.

Stefan is expected to be appointed to head the KBH in August. We were told at his current workplace that he is on vacation but, according to information we have received, rather than spending his time resting, he is learning about certain details of his future job.

The proposal will be made by the defense minister, and the appointment will be signed by the prime minister. [Defense Minister] Gyorgy Keleti told NEPSZAVA that coordination talks with the Alliance of Free Democrats—as stipulated in the coalition agreement—had already taken place. About the possible promotion of Colonel Stefan, Keleti said that, in theory, every colonel has the chance of becoming a general, but this will be decided later.

Political State Secretary on Minority Policy

AU2607113494 Budapest NEPSZAVA in Hungarian 23 Jul 94 pp 1, 10

[Interview with Hungarian Political State Secretary Csaba Tabajdi by Ferenc Garzo; place and date not given: "More Help Instead of Aid—Csaba Tabajdi on National Minority Policy"]

[Text] Hungarians living beyond the border do not expect mere aid from us, rather, they require us also to help them to prosperity with the means of bourgeois transformation. According to the new Hungarian Government, relations with the neighboring countries cannot become a "hostage" to the Hungarian minority issue. Csaba Tabajdi, political state secretary at the Prime Minister's Office, and who, from now on, supervises the two government offices dealing with the issues of national minorities, spoke about these issues in his interview with NEPSZAVA.

[Garzo] One office deals with the Hungarians living over the border while the other deals with the situation of national minorities living in Hungary. You supervise the activities of both offices. Is it possible to apply the same standards, and is it possible to use the experience gained in one area in the other?

[Tabajdi] In my view, the two areas have to be handled in completely different ways, even if the national minority policy—that is just being formed as an independent branch of public administration—does have basic principles. We, that is the Hungarian state, are basically responsible for guaranteeing the rights of national and ethnic minorities living in Hungary. The National Minority Law will have its main test in the autumn, therefore, in the near future, most of my office work will be taken up by the issue of national minorities in Hungary. I consider it important not to make the two areas dependent on each other. Our policy regarding the national minorities in Hungary cannot depend on the way the Hungarians are treated in the neighboring countries.

In addition to this, the Hungarians living beyond the border have completely different circumstances compared to the minorities living here. The ancestors of the latter voluntarily chose this land as their place of living centuries ago, therefore, in addition to having the consciousness of being national minorities, they also have a strong Hungarian consciousness. However, this duality

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does not apply to the Hungarians living beyond the border; they became the citizens of the state where they are living after a peace treaty, under constraint.

[Garzo] Our new foreign minister has said it many times that a new kind of style and attitude has to be established in foreign policy. What does this mean for your area?

[Tabajdi] We need to have a change of emphasis in our politics affecting the Hungarians beyond the border. The protection of rights occupied the primary position in the activities of the former government, namely the Hungarian leadership's intention to continually keep raising the legal violations against the Hungarians beyond the border in bilateral relations and at international forums. The current government, not denying the importance of these actions, considers it at least as important to promote the prosperity of minorities in their place of birth. This includes the establishment of livelihoods, their participation in privatization, bourgeois transformation, more active participation in local public administration, and local self-organization. This does not mean that the current government has significantly more money to implement these goals. Rather than investments, aids, and donations, we must mainly think of passing on the professional, managerial, legal, and economic knowledge that is indispensable in the private economy, in the enterprises. We have to involve the Hungarians beyond the border with more determination in regaining the eastern markets and in our economic relations with the neighboring countries.

In recent years, a significant section of Hungarian society has felt that the government exaggerated the problems of national minorities, it seemed that this was more important than the domestic economic and social transformation. We would like to make the Hungarian public feel that, in addition to care and aid, the Hungarians beyond the border also need cooperation that can even be seen as profitable investments on the medium term.

Party and ideological points of view have divided the Hungarian organizations over the border in the past years. Financial aid for them was uneven (some were favored and others disadvantaged). Therefore, the new government wishes to make the the system of financial assistance transparent, democratic, and controllable.

[Garzo] So much about the Hungarian intentions. However, the willingness of the partners—the political leaders of neighboring countries—is also necessary to implement the goals. It is obviously easier to work together on these issues with the Slovak government lead by [Slovak Prime Minister Josef] Moravcik and more difficult with a Meciar-type leadership, which also has a chance to get into power in Slovakia. Is the Hungarian side prepared for this possibility?

[Tabajdi] Whatever turn the events may take, I consider it important now also to have contacts with Meciar, who is currently in opposition, as well as with the Moravcik cabinet.

As a matter of fact, I believe that the Hungarian side has not made full use of the possibilities of dialogue in the past years. The Hungarian Government restrained economic contacts because relations were laden with the stension arising from the Bos [dam] issue and the national minority issue. Our approach is completely different. We try to make progress in all areas where it is possible.

This does not mean that we will not speak up if the Hungarian minority suffers violations in a neighboring country, but the entire system of relations cannot be a hostage to the national minority issue. However, I must add that relations with our neighbors cannot be seen to be settled if the rights of Hungarians living there are not guaranteed.

Official Discusses Ministry Reorganization

AU2607183594 Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 26 Jul 94 p 6

[Interview with Peter Szerdahelyi, administrative state secretary at the Agricultural Ministry, by Gyorgy O. Horvath; place and date not given: "The Control of Agriculture Is Being Changed"]

[Text] New minister, new state secretaries. The top three leaders of the Agricultural Ministry have been replaced, although Administrative State Secretary Peter Szerdahelyi was a deputy state secretary before. Can we expect structural changes in the Ministry at Kossuth Square? What will happen to the organizations set up by the former government—for example, the county agricultural offices, professional service institutions, and the network of village farming experts? We interviewed Szerdahelyi on these issues among others.

[Horvath] It might not be an exaggeration to say that even within the Ministry, not everyone has been satisfied with the ministry's operation in the past four years. Many working groups and main departments existed that dealt with the same issues with little coordination, while certain issues were not dealt with at all. How does the new leadership want to change this?

[Szerdahelyi] The problems are caused by the blank spots rather than the parallels. The establishment of the new government provides an opportunity for reorganization. The essence of this within the Ministry is that as deputy state secretarial work gains a higher status, a bigger emphasis will be given to this function in the future. Up until now, the Ministry and the state secretaries have supervised too many main departments and institutions. Therefore, they did not have any time for coordination and integration work. Instead, it is more expedient to assign tasks to the deputy state secretaries with a thematic division of labor. This will not cause major changes, but I hope that the efficiency will improve. The number of main departments directly under the supervision of deputy state secretaries will increase. The tasks are: coordination of authoritative

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and legal tasks, supervision according to economic branches, economic coordination, and supervision of the ministry and the enterprises belonging to it. The internal restructuring does not involve much movement. We implement the rationalization along the already existing basic structure. However, this does not stop us from merging some departments, and it will be necessary to set up some work-teams. To mention but one: The agromarketing organization that deals with community marketing will be one of these.

[Horvath] What changes can we expect in the division of labor between the ministries? Many people blamed the previous agricultural leadership for being weak within the government.

[Szerdahelyi] With the merger of the Ministry of International Economic Relations [NGKM], we have gained a stronger position at the inter-ministerial talks because now we only have to convince two partners—the Finance Ministry and the Industry and Trade Ministry—instead of three. With the abolition of the NGKM, we intend to have a much bigger role in allocating the subsidies as regards the food industry's export and import regulations. This can also be said about the agricultural education, although it is too early to talk about this. As a matter of fact, the government decided on Tuesday [19 July] that all ministries will be able to revise their spheres of authority by 31 August.

[Horvath] When will the Ministry's leadership be fully functional?

[Szerdahelyi] I think the Ministry's complete leadership will be ready by mid-August, and then the Ministry can gain its final form within two to three months after consultations with the main departments and the affected people.

[Horvath] What role do the three leaders intend for themselves? What kind of division of labor can we expect between you, especially regarding the role of the political state secretary?

[Szerdahelyi] Up until now, this has been changing all the time. The political state secretary's area of responsibility depended on the attitude and character of the minister. The current financial state secretary is an economic expert and he is very likely to take an active role in the professional work. In our case, this will not be like that. All professional work will be concentrated in the hands of the administrative state secretary. Zoltan Kis will probably deal with political and parliamentary issues, and work to do with the parliamentary agricultural committee will also be his task. In addition to this, he will maintain relations with the interest representations and mediate the coalition's agricultural policy to them.

[Horvath] For the farmers and marketing men, the similar professional service organizations and the parallel handling of tasks causes problems. I am referring to the agricultural offices, and the animal-health, plant protection, food hygiene, and environmental protection institutions. Will their relationship to each other change?

[Szerdahelyi] I do not think the agricultural offices belong on this list. These have "special" tasks. At any rate, I do not believe that a ministry can be adequately informed without information and experiences from the provinces. In the case of our professional services, the question is always raised whether they should be merged or operated separately. Budget savings are the most important aspect. I would not commit myself in either direction at the moment because I do not have impartial and well- founded information yet. In the near future, we will certainly assess and control the situation of these institutions. In the case of the professional services, we must make sure that the tasks of authority do not get confused with the service type tasks, and at the agricultural offices, the representation of agricultural policy and that the related authoritative tasks are not confused with the professional tasks.

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Pawlak Evades Self-Government Question

MM2607135094 Poznan GAZETA POZNANSKA in Polish 20 Jul 94 p 3

[Article by Zenon Bosacki: "Leader of the People?"]

[Text] I recently asked Prime Minister Pawlak when new self-governed districts are likely to be created in Poland. I asked it deliberately, during his press conference at Cegielski [rolling-stock manufacturing company], choosing as the subject of my question neither industry nor privatization and hoping for a brief and therefore frank reply.

The reply began with the words: "You could just as easily have asked when a self-governed voivodship would be likely to come into existence in Poland." To my regret, our talk was not informal enough because I would then have pointed out to the prime minister that he could just as well have answered the hypothetical question: "When will the population of goats in Poland be doubled?" with the reply: "As soon as the number of cows has gone up by 100 percent." Generally, the practice that is followed worldwide is that the top two administrative levels are the domain of the government, while the next two fall within the brief of the local self-government structures. Thus, comparing districts to voivodships is, in this case, completely out of place. In any case, when it comes to politics, much depends on the professed viewpoint.

In a further part of his reply, Prime Minister Pawlak illustrated his views on self-government structures above the parish level by using the example of local self-government organs taking over school administration in their regions, although I never asked him to comment on such details. The prime minister's argument against the creation of new, self-governing districts goes as follows: "To begin with, we eliminate certain solutions, only to come to the eventual conclusion, after several years and with much enthusiasm, that they were perfectly marvellous. During the economic crisis in the 1920's, the domain of education was handed over to local self-government structures, only to be brought back under the state's aegis in the 1930's, with the aim of achieving a comparable level of the functioning of the education system in all regions of the country." Thus, according to the prime minister, the administrative reform could come to grief today because it came to grief three generations back, in a Poland that was an altogether different country. The number of people with higher education at that time was smaller by a factor of 20 or thereabouts; also, Poland was a multinational country that stretched from Zbaszyn to Braslaw and Stanislawow (anyone wishing to find the last two names on the map should look for the former north of Vilnius, and for the latter in the southeast, where the name "Ivano-Frankovsk" appears these days).

To conclude, when Prime Minister Pawlak refuses to endorse, say, a decision concerning the privatization program, I cannot really disagree with him because the discipline of economics is not one of my strengths. Nevertheless, the way in which the prime minister justifies his other decisions throws considerable doubt over all of his actions.

Pawlak conducts his discussion with journalists at a level for which I have no suitable name. Skulduggery? Subterfuge? Prevarication? Manipulation? Perhaps a more delicate way of expressing it (because it is of foreign origin) is demagoguery. However, that term has departed from its original meaning, which began with "leading the people." It then went through "a method of influencing public opinion, which boils down to failing to fulfill given promises," and ended with "taking advantage of the ignorance of the lower social strata." A recent movie was entitled "Look Who's Talking." In this case, the question that suggests itself is: "And who does he think he is talking to?"

Budget Guidelines Cause Rift Between Ministers

LD2607193194 Warsaw TVP Television First Program Network in Polish 1730 GMT 26 Jul 94

[Relayed by Warsaw TV Polonia Network in Polish; passages contained within quotation marks are recorded]

[Text] [Announcer] The government has been discussing guidelines for the state budget next year. The guidelines envisage, among other things, the reinstatement of the previous, lower personal income tax thresholds. The thresholds will be set at 20, 30, and 40 percent. The draft budget also envisages that the VAT [value-added tax] on electric power, which is now set at 7 percent, will not be raised.

[Unidentified correspondent] The guidelines for the state budget next year envisage that the state income will amount to 785 trillion zlotys [Z]. The expenditure will exceed Z872 trillion [on-screen graph shows the figure Z873 trillion], and the budget deficit will not exceed Z88 trillion. It transpires from the preliminary information that the heads of ministries want several billion zloty more than it has been offered to them by the Finance Ministry. [National Defense Minister Piotr Kolodziejczyk] "The MON [Ministry of National Defense] budget cannot be smaller—and it seems this is going to happen—than the budget this year because it simply means a disaster for the Army."

[Health Minister Jacek Zochowski] "I cannot accept that this program, as presented here by Professor Kolodko, is the final program. Perhaps it is just a game, an attempt to play with figures. I cannot treat seriously what has been proposed to us today."

[Correspondent] The majority of ministers had similar reservations.

[Finance Minister Grzegorz Kolodko] "If I were the minister of national education or the minister of justice, I would also be more concerned about money for investment and pay for the ministry I were in charge of—

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education or courts—than about the balance in the public finance system as a whole, or about combating inflation."

[Correspondent] According to the Finance Ministry, inflation should be reduced from the 24 percent forecast for this year to 16 percent next year.

The budget guidelines for 1995 envisage the reinstatement of the 20-, 30-, and 40-percent income tax thresholds.

[Deputy Finance Minister Elzbieta Chojna-Duch] "The loss of budget income resulting from the lowering of the tax thresholds will amount to, roughly—this is an estimate—Z8 trillion. If we did not decide to forgo this, we would have additional state budget income. However, this is a political decision, which has to be made by the Council of Ministers and approved by parliament."

[Correspondent] The ministers now have three months to reconcile their expectations with the budget guidelines.

Government Discusses Budget

WS2707092994 Warsaw POLSKA ZBROJNA in Polish 27 Jul 94 p 1

[Article by R. Ch.: "Council of Ministers on the 1995 Budget; How Much Will the Army Get?"]

[Text] Intensive work is under way on next year's state budget. Providing the foundation for this work are the economic results of the first six months of this year. According to the Central Planning Administration, industrial output is growing, as is the GDP. Wages and inflation were higher than planned, while unemployment is stabilizing.

On the basis of this trend as well as many other indexes, the government, at its 26 July session, discussed next year's revenues and expenditures for the state's coffers. It is predicted that the GDP should be 5 percent higher. This means there will be more money in the budget (by 6 percentage points in real terms).

Higher yields to the state coffers will not result from higher taxes. On the contrary, it is predicted that personal income tax rates will be low in relation to this year's rates. The VAT [value-added tax] rates on coal, energy, and natural gas (7 percent instead of 22 percent) will not be increased, either. Considerable revenues will be generated by privatization.

At the same time, it is expected that the budget deficit should not exceed 3.5 percent of the GDP. Next year's inflation, calculated from December 1994 to December 1995, should amount to 16 percent. So-called permanent expenditures will increase quite substantially, primarily to service the domestic debt. If one takes into account the money needed for social insurance subsidies or to service the foreign debt, as well as wages for budget-sector employees, it may turn out that the substantive expenditures in the budget sector will not really meet our expectations. As we have found out, the preliminary limit for the Ministry of National Defense for 1995 does not exceed 60 trillion zlotys. The government adopted the draft law on special economic zones and will urgently forward it to the Sejm.

Constitutional Drafts, Church Support Viewed

WS2707110094 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish 27 Jul 94 p 10

[Article by Roman Graczyk under the "Opinions" rubric: "Walesa's Riddle"]

[Text] *The Solidarity constitution has no chance in the Sejm. Its rejection, however, will help the president reinstate the anticommunist camp of the dissatisfied. The question is: How will he convince them to vote for him?* ponders Roman Graczyk.

Solidarity and the Secretariat of Center/Right-Wing Parties came up last week with a so-called citizens' constitutional draft, and they began a campaign to collect signatures in support of the document. Collecting 500,000 signatures is a set condition for having the draft submitted before the National Assembly's constitutional commission.

It seems that the citizens' draft will easily manage to garner the required number of signatures because the campaign includes Solidarity structures, while several bishops have also expressed their support for the draft; signatures may also be collected outside churches. What is interesting is that the president has also declared his support for the draft, despite the fact that his constitutional draft, which is based on opposite principles, is waiting to be debated by the National Assembly's constitutional commission.

A Catholic Poland

The bishops' support is not a surprise because the citizens' draft meets the constitutional demands of the episcopate.

In the preamble, the draft's authors invoke a "thousand-year-old tradition associated with the legacy of Christian faith and culture," while the preamble ends with the words: "We determine and adopt the above constitution for the Third Republic solemnly and in the name of God." When we compare that with some other drafts, we will see that the draft of neither the Freedom Union [UW] nor the Democratic Left Alliance [SLD] contains any religious connotations.

Regarding state-church relations, the Solidarity constitutional draft says that the state "guarantees autonomy and independence to the various churches and religious associations," and it adds that the state "cooperates with the Catholic Church and with other churches and religious associations for the sake of accomplishing the common good." As we can see, these provisions are

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almost identical to the Concordat's provisions, which define "autonomy and cooperation" between church and state. The UW draft contains similar provisions, even though it uses different terms, while the SLD states that the Republic of Poland "is a lay state."

Regarding religious education for children, the Solidarity draft states: "Parents have a right to secure religious education for their children. The state secures the teaching of religion in public schools in accordance with the will of the parents." The drafts of UW and the SLD, on the other hand, are limited to securing the rights of parents to raise their children in accordance with their own views.

There are also differences among the drafts regarding the issue of abortion and euthanasia. Solidarity says: "Human life is under special protection from conception until natural death." Both the UW and the SLD drafts take a more general approach to the issue, and, even though both drafts take the stance of protecting life, the relevant provisions do not categorically prohibit either abortion or euthanasia.

A Socialist Poland

Kazimierz Janiak, who is coordinating the signature collection campaign on behalf of the trade union, denied during a press conference that the Solidarity draft is of a socialist nature. It seems, however, that there is something to be said for that.

I am saying that because the constitutional draft coming from Solidarity states that "participation of employee organizations in the process of managing enterprises" is one of the traits defining the state economy (which, incidentally, the draft calls "market economy."). The SLD draft contains a very similar provision on the issue, while the UW draft says nothing about it.

Solidarity sets the maximum allowed workweek at 40 hours. The SLD says the same thing, while the UW speaks about a 42-hour workweek.

Granting the Trilateral Commission [government-employers-employees] constitutional status is the most unique (and also the most controversial) provision of the Solidarity draft. The draft states: "The level of minimum wages, minimum guaranteed income, and norms of labor shall be determined by the Trilateral Commission (...)." This means that some social issues are being excluded from the range of duties by the parliament and government, and there occurs a resultant partial questioning of the rules of representative democracy.

A Parliamentary Poland

The Solidarity draft differs from the UW one—and, in particular, from the SLD one—by the degree of "catholicization" and "socialization" (particularly when compared with the UW draft). There are other types of differences, which are nonetheless major, between the Solidarity draft and the presidential one.

The latter is less favorably predisposed toward the episcopate's constitutional demands, and it greatly differs from the trade union's draft when it comes to social issues (it is more liberal). When it comes to issues of political regime, though, Walesa and [Solidarity chairman] Krzaklewski take opposite stands.

The trade union's draft is in favor of a parliamentary-cabinet type of system. True, the trade unionists do not reduce the presidential office to purely representative functions, but they say that real power is in the hands of the parliamentary majority and a government that is voted upon by that majority. The president nominates the prime minister and the government, but the Council of Ministers is required to ask that the Sejm grant it a vote of confidence. Without confidence from the Sejm, there is no government. The president, in turn, cannot dismiss the government because it enjoys the Sejm's confidence.

The Belweder's draft takes exactly the opposite position. According to the draft, the president is empowered to establish a government on his own, and such a government does not have to receive a vote of confidence from the Sejm. This means that, until the Sejm itself comes up with an initiative to have the government recalled, such a government, based solely on the president's confidence, may, in fact, be in office. The presidential draft does not say that the president is not allowed to dismiss a government that enjoys the Sejm's confidence, either. In such a case, the Sejm can pass a vote of no-confidence with regard to the next government (which is set up by the president), but, in any event, the president's room for maneuvering is quite great, according to the Belweder's draft.

So, generally speaking, one can say that Lech Walesa is suggesting in his draft the adoption of a two-power system, using the French Fifth Republic as a model, while Solidarity is in favor of a parliamentary-cabinet system (one where the parliamentary majority rules).

After The Holiday Season or Even Later

Last Friday, Kazimierz Janiak said that the trade unionists have managed to gain the support of five bishops for the draft: Archbishop Tadeusz Goclowski, Bishop Jan Szlaga, Archbishop Edward Piszcz, Cardinal Franciszek Macharski, and Archbishop Damian Zimon. Over the past few days, the press has reported more names: The Solidarity draft is also being supported by Wroclaw metropolitan Cardinal Henryk Gulbinowicz, Episcopate Secretary Bishop Tadeusz Pieronek, and a Kielce church official named Kazimierz Ryczan, who has also addressed provosts to make it possible to collect signatures outside church buildings.

The draft is also being supported by Tarnow Bishop Jozef Zycinski, who thinks that the draft "represents the principles of ethics and philosophical assumptions that are very close to Christian thought. It adopts the primacy

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of natural law over decisions made arbitrarily by legislators." The bishop has issued an appeal to diocese members to get involved; their involvement, he said, will be a form of "compensation for the slap on the Holy Father's face, referring to the results of the Sejm vote delaying the Concordat's ratification. The bishop said we could have not influenced the Sejm's decision, but we can influence future measures and the future shape of the motherland."

It is too early to speak about church involvement in political maneuvering. The church can sound convincing when it claims to want to defend the rights of those members of society who are not represented in parliament. It can also prove its axiological involvement. Bishop Pieronek stresses that the ethical items raised by the draft are completely acceptable to the church, while issues concerning the political regime are "secondary" to the church.

There is one proviso, though: The church supports the draft that contains specific and controversial solutions pertaining to the political regime, such as the constitutional status of the Trilateral Commission, for example. It supports the draft that, as can be seen clearly these days, sets political divisions in motion. This could lead to a repeat of the situation from recent times, when the church spoke out unanimously in favor of one side of Polish politics and, by doing that, spoke out equally unanimously against some other people. The communique issued after the episcopate's conference in Lomza, as well as reactions by many bishops to the delay in the Concordat's ratification, support such suppositions.

On the other hand, the church's support cannot be a surprise. Only the so-called Senate draft was equally far-reaching in recognizing the bishops' constitutional demands, but its significance is incomparably smaller these days than that of the Solidarity draft. The Senate draft was submitted to the National Assembly's constitutional commission because the parliament carried over drafts from the previous terms, but there is almost no one in this parliament who would be willing to support the draft.

The position of Solidarity is completely different: Its draft, which enjoys the support of half a million voters or more, could be portrayed as the voice of the 30 percent of Polish society not represented in parliament. It is true that the Solidarity draft has no chance in either the Sejm or the Senate, but its rejection could be interpreted as a sign of "the communists'" arrogance, and this is something for which the draft's authors and some other people are definitely hoping. To reject the Solidarity draft in this kind of climate, which appears increasingly likely, creates every chance that a "no" answer will be delivered in the constitutional referendum.

This is exactly what Lech Walesa is expecting. So, this is why the president has been verbally supporting the draft, which conflicts substantially with his principles of political regime. The president is aware that his draft will be rejected by the National Assembly, as well, so he would rather ignore the differences between the drafts and build a common front.

Walesa, having a very slim chance of reelection, is trying to reinstate an anticommunist and Catholic camp. His declarations such as "Enough of the communist system!" and his statements on "those who have the nerve to not believe in God," which he voiced as a response to the postponement of the Concordat's ratification, are clear proof of that. The liberalization of the antiabortion law by parliament put a weapon in Walesa's hand, which, in accordance with his personal beliefs, the president used for the same goal. Right now, while predicting the course of events on the issue of the constitution, he is getting ready to lead those who will say "no" in the constitutional referendum. It looks as though this will be quite a camp: Walesa, Solidarity, the center-right wing, perhaps the church, and possibly UW, as well. Chances that a "no" answer will prevail seem realistic.

The problem remains, however, that there are usually many people willing to admit being the authors of a success. So Lech Walesa's riddle for the next several months is how to convince those who will say "no" in the constitutional referendum to say "yes" to his candidacy in the presidential elections, and with the least possible loss in terms of votes.

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Serbs Blockade Only Sarajevo Exit Route

AU2707102194 Paris AFP in English 1002 GMT 27 Jul 94

[Excerpts] Sarajevo, July 27 (AFP)—Bosnian Serbs Wednesday forced the closure of the only exit route for Bosnian civilians out of Sarejevo, correspondents reported.

The Bosnian exit route connecting the southern suburb of Dobrinja to Butmir—usually packed with traffic as of mid-morning—was empty and quiet Wednesday, an AFP correspondent reported. [passage omitted]

From Butmir, the road winds across the Igman mountain and towards the Adriatic coast. Since April it has been used for commercial convoys providing food for the city.

UNPROFOR spokeswoman Claire Grimes said that that UN special envoy Yasushi Akashi would contact Karadzic Wednesday over the closure and to discuss restrictions on movement in Serb-held zones.

Meanwhile an unnamed UNPROFOR [United Nations Protection Force] source said the United Nations feared its movements in Serb areas could soon be restricted "completely."

According to unconfirmed reports Wednesday, the Serbs had informed UNPROFOR it would no longer be permitted to use roads in the self-proclaimed Bosnian Serb republic, which covers around 70 percent of Bosnia.

Currently, UN convoys are banned from passing through Serb checkpoints on Mondays and Fridays.

Separately, Grimes said heavy exchanges of machine-gun fire and explosions rocked the Bosnian capital overnight Tuesday in a marked increase in hostilities. She added that Sarajevo was quiet Wednesday morning.

In the eastern enclave of Gorazde the Serbs fired on Bosnian forces Tuesday evening with "what we believe to be a mortar," she said.

Both Sarajevo and Goradze are surrounded by 20-kilometre (12- mile) UN exclusion zones from which the warring parties were obliged to withdraw all heavy weapons under threat of North Atlantic Treaty Organisation air strikes.

Serb forces have repeatedly violated the Gorazde zone in the last four days, correspondents reported.

Karadzic served notice of the impending closure of the Bosnian exit route in a letter to UNPROFOR Tuesday, said Victor Andreyev, UN civil affairs coordinator for Bosnia. [passage omitted]

With their unilateral decision to cancel the agreement "until further notice," the Serbs effectively stopped the Bosnian side using their route.

The Serbs have the capacity to enforce the closure, as the Bosnian "blue route" is only 100 metres (yards) away from the first Serb houses.

Izetbegovic said earlier that UNPROFOR told the Bosnian side they "could not provide security for that road."

Andreyev said the UN would pursue the closure in negotiations with the Serb side, adding that UNPROFOR "had no proof" of gun-running by the Bosnian Government.

The closure comes after last week's suspension of aid flights to Sarajevo airport after five UN planes were fired at.

Further on Road Closure

AU2707115894 Paris AFP in English 1133 GMT 27 Jul 94

[Excerpts] Sarajevo, July 27 (AFP)—Grimes later said that UNPROFOR considers the Serb closure of the only exit route for civilians out of the capital "a serious step backwards, but not the reinstatement of the siege."

The UNPROFOR spokeswoman conceded however that the closure of the road "will cut the commercial traffic" in the capital.

Grimes said that Visoko road, which leads out of the city northwards, was still open. But since the Visoko road goes entirely through Serb-held areas Grimes did "not believe there was any possibility for commercial food convoys" though this route.

The closure of the airport road came after the office of UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) suspended relief flights into Sarajevo after five planes were shot at over a period of three days last week.

Grimes dismissed Karadzic's allegations Tuesday that the Moslems were using the airport road to smuggle arms into Sarajevo, saying there was "never any military material found."

Karadzic also accused the Bosnian side of refusing to implement an agreement signed by the warring factions last month calling for a prisoner exchange and the release of information on missing persons, though the two issues were not to be linked.

But a spokesman for the International Committee of the Red Cross, Lisa Jones, said "neither side has complied with the agreement."

She said both sides presented lists of POWs but the Serb side did not present a list of missing persons. The Moslems retaliated by linking any release of POWs with information on missing persons, so no large-scale exchange has yet taken place.

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Karadzic: Blockade 'Temporary'

LD2707000794 Belgrade TANJUG in English 2251 GMT 26 Jul 94

["Pool" item]

[Text] Belgrade, July 26 (TANJUG)—Bosnian Serb President Radovan Karadzic said Tuesday the Serb side's decision to close U.N.-supervised routes for civilian traffic in and out of Sarajevo was only temporary.

Passage across Sarajevo airport has been suspended for both Serbs and Moslems, because Moslems are still sniping at Serbs, disregarding prisoner exchange agreements and constantly attacking on all fronts in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Bosnian Serb news agency SRNA quotes Karadzic as saying.

SRNA quotes Bosnian Serb spokesman Jovan Zametica as saying that two of the routes, known as 'blue routes', in Sarajevo—between Lukavica and Ilidza for Serbs and Butmir (airport) and Dobrinja for Moslems—would be closed as of Wednesday.

Zametica explained this was necessary because Moslems had been smuggling arms and ammunition across the runway. He said international relief aid convoys would still be going into the city by the usual routes via Bosnian Serb territory.

United Nations spokesman Joe Sills said in New York Tuesday that Bosnian Serbs had decided to close to commercial traffic a route across Mt Igman near Sarajevo. The step has been taken out of fear that it has been used for smuggling weapons and because the Moslem authorities are refusing to negotiate prisoner exchanges.

Sill did not comment on the reasons, but said the Igman route was used by commercial convoys which had been bringing in one-half of the food need by the Sarajevo population.

This will place an additional burden on the U.N. High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) which will have to increase its overland aid convoys and airdrops, he added.

Izetbegovic: Ignore Serb Decision

LD2607221994 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 2000 GMT 26 Jul 94

[Text] Following the decision by Karadzic's Serbs to seal off the Blue Route leading through Sarajevo airport, a meeting was held at the Bosnia-Herzegovina Presidency between Alija Izetbegovic, the president of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Presidency, Bosnia-Herzegovina Prime Minister Haris Silajdzic, Ejup Ganic, vice president of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation and member of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Presidency, General Michael Rose, UNPROFOR's [UN PROTECTION FORCE] commander in chief for Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Victor Andreyev, the head of UNPROFOR's Civilian Department for Bosnia-Herzegovina.

President Izetbegovic demanded that UNPROFOR does not honor this unilateral decision, to which the UNPROFOR representatives replied that they were not in the position to guarantee the functioning of this road. True, they admitted that the decision was a unilateral and groundless one because the reasons cited in the letter were untrue and unfounded, President Izetbegovic said in a statement after the meeting.

The letter, among other things, claims that the Bosnian side was using this road for transporting arms shipments, which, in Izetbegovic's words, is absolutely untrue, because UNPROFOR is in charge of inspecting the goods.

This is an attempt to undermine the peace process and thus take a great step backward. Of course, the responsibility for this lies completely with the aggressor side, President Izetbegovic underlined.

Victor Andreyev, the head of UNPROFOR's Civilian Department for Bosnia-Herzegovina, confirmed that UNPROFOR had received this letter, which annuls the part of the agreement on the Blue Routes, that is, on the freedom of crossing the airport runway.

We know all too well how important these Blue Routes are, and we can see no reason for such a decision; our intention is to do all we can to return the situation to what it was before, Andreyev said, stressing that UNPROFOR representatives will be meeting tomorrow with the Serb aggressor side.

Asked whether the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army could have smuggled arms without UNPROFOR's knowledge, Victor Andreyev said that UNPROFOR had no evidence pointing to the existence of such shipments.

President Izetbegovic added in the end that the Bosnia-Herzegovina Presidency and government will contact the UN Security Council in connection with this case.

Krajisnik: New Assembly Meeting Not Ruled Out

LD2607171594 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1555 GMT 26 Jul 94

[Text] Zvornik, 26 Jul (TANJUG)—Momcilo Krajisnik, president of the People's Assembly of the Serb republic, told TANJUG today that the decision of the Assembly of the Serb republic obligated the negotiating team but he did not rule out another session of the parliament in Pale.

"The decision of our parliament is the law for me, the negotiating team, and the Serb people," Krajisnik made it clear prior to his meeting with Russia's representatives.

He explained that the Serb side "respects all mediators," including the Russians, but "by no means can it change the decision of the assembly" and accept something that will not satisfy the people.

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Krajisnik mentioned "close cooperation and coordination with Serbia, Montenegro, and Yugoslavia," stressing that there will be no "deviations that will threaten the interests of Serbia and Montenegro."

Krajisnik recalled the decision of the Assembly of the Serb republic, according to which foreign armed forces will not be allowed to enter the territory of the Serb republic.

"To our mind NATO forces are neither unbiased nor impartial. The assembly's decision applies to them too," Krajisnik said.

He nevertheless, admitted to a possibility of the Assembly making another round of decisionmaking in view of the fateful consequences, because, as he said, "it is never too late to accept or reject as every decision has its historic consequences."

This is precisely why we are not deciding lightly on the final solution, but "if need be we will get the Serbs together easily to decide once again," Krajisnik said in conclusion.

Karadzic Warns of Deployment of NATO Forces

LD2607171394 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1524 GMT 26 Jul 94

[Text] Zvornik, 26 Jul (TANJUG)—Prior to his departure for talks with Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev, Radovan Karadzic, president of the Bosnian Serb republic, said in Zvornik today that he would inform the Russians "of the Serbs' wariness about NATO's intentions."

Karadzic told a group of assembled correspondents that the North Atlantic military alliance has thinly veiled intentions of "becoming installed in these parts" through the Bosnian Serbs' approval of the plan proposed by the Contact Group.

"We are absolutely convinced that this is an extremely dangerous game," Karadzic said, adding that the ploy conceals NATO's wish to redeploy its forces from Western Europe and Germany to the Balkans.

Warning that the arrival of NATO troops without the Serbs' consent would be an act of aggression, Karadzic stressed that the Bosnian Serbs will "wage both frontal and guerilla warfare against any formations that come here against our will."

The Serb republic president assessed that the latest statements by Russian diplomats, especially Minister Kozyrev, are "encouraging".

"We really ought to impress our conviction on our Russian friends that what we are dealing with here is not only the defense of the Serbs in the Serb republic and the republic of Serb Krajina, but also the defense of the Serbs in Serbia and the Russians in Russia," Karadzic stressed.

Asked whether he believes the Contact Group will continue presenting a united front on the issue of peace in Bosnia, Karadzic said that unity will be preserved only if America changes its stance and accepts the Serbian response.

Speaking about the pressures on the Serbs in Bosnia to accept the latest peace plan, Karadzic said that the leadership of the Serb republic is not under pressure from its people, because "our people know that we will not hand over those territories (on which Serbs live)."

"As far as pressures from abroad are concerned," he added, "our basic task is not to act under pressure and not to allow it to influence our decisions."

Speaking about UN Secretary General Butrus Ghali's proposal to replace the UN peace forces by NATO forces, Karadzic said that "what we have always feared and warned our brothers in Serbia and the whole of the peace-loving world about" is coming true.

Karadzic said that "the whole game around Bosnia-Herzegovina is in fact an attempt to destroy the unity of Europe and an attempt to position NATO along Serbia's borders and encircle Serbia and Russia."

Commenting on the latest solution offered by the Contact Group, Karadzic said that "some things from the plan are acceptable."

Silajdzic Warns Contact Group of Credibility Loss

AU2607151894 Paris AFP in English 1453 GMT 26 Jul 94

[Text] [No dateline as received] (AFP)—Bosnian Prime Minister Haris Salajdzic warned here Tuesday [26 July] of a "great credibility problem" if the international contact group failed to take all promised measures, should Bosnian Serbs definitely reject its peace plan.

"If this does not happen we will have a great credibility problem, and, I'm afraid, a wider war in the region," Silajdzic told journalists.

A proposal by UN Secretary General Butrus Butrus-Ghali to transfer implementation of the plan to the contact group and withdraw UN peacekeepers from Bosnia if the warring parties reject the peace plan is "practically a punishment" for Moslem Bosnians trying to defend themselves, Silajdzic said.

"It is quite surprising because in a way it prejudices the contact group decisions," Prime Minister Haris Silajdzic told reporters.

Silajdzic said he saw no automatic link between Bosnian requests for lifting a UN-imposed arms embargo and the withdrawal of the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR).

The international contact group which has proposed a take-it-or-leave-it peace plan for the former Yugoslav Republic has warned that lifting of an arms embargo

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against the former Yugoslavia was a possible step if the separatist Serbs definitely reject the peace proposal.

"We should not be punished for wanting to defend ourselves," said Silajdzic.

Bosnian President Alija Izetbegovic said after a meeting here Tuesday with Jack Cunningham, the British Labour Party's foreign affairs spokesman, that the withdrawal of UNPROFOR should be a process "parallel to the arrival of NATO troops to Bosnia."

Sarajevo Radio said Silajdzic stressed that the Bosnian government's positive answer to the contact group's peace proposal would stay "until we see what will happen in Geneva" on Saturday when the contact group's foreign ministers meet.

The contact group comprises Britain, France, Germany, Russia and the United States.

Warns of War's Escalation

AU2607184294 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 26 Jul 94

[Text] After a meeting between President Alija Izetbegovic and Bosnia-Herzegovina Prime Minister Haris Silajdzic with Jack Cunningham, leader of the [British] Labor Party [title as received], the reporters asked for their comments on the statement by UN Secretary-General Butrus-Ghali that he would recommend the withdrawal of the UN peace forces from Bosnia-Herzegovina if the peace plan is not accepted.

President Izetbegovic stressed that the withdrawal of the UN Protection Force [UNPROFOR] would have to be a process parallel to the arrival of NATO forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Prime Minister Haris Silajdzic [word indistinct] that the statement by Secretary-General Butrus-Ghali was practically a punishment for us for trying to defend ourselves. The international community has not acted in accordance with the UN Charter. According to the Helsinki principles, the borders have to be protected and that is the main problem, Dr. Silajdzic said.

Asked by reporters whether the Bosnia-Herzegovina Government would change its decision to accept the contact group's proposal after the aggressor rejected it, Prime Minister Silajdzic said: Our acceptance remains until we see what happens next. We said Yes when the choice was between take it or leave it, and that remains until we see what happens now.

Jack Cunningham, leader of the Labor Party of Great Britain [title as received], told reporters that this morning in Pale [word indistinct] pity for the Serbs if they continue to reject the plan. Under these circumstances I am quite surprised by the proposal to withdraw UN troops before 30 July. I do not see that it is wise but, if the arms embargo is lifted, I do not think that the position of the United Nations is tenable, Cunningham said.

Asked whether the contact group would act upon its promises, Prime Minister Silajdzic said that our government expected the contact group to take action. If nothing is done, there could be an escalation of the war, Silajdzic said.

Serbian Forces Take UNHCR Official Hostage

LD2607235994 Belgrade TANJUG in English 2259 GMT 26 Jul 94

[Text] Belgrade, July 26 (TANJUG)—Bosnian Serb forces have taken a United Nations official hostage in Gorazde, a U.N. spokesman said in Sarajevo Tuesday. The hostage, chief of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) operation in that Moslem enclave in eastern Bosnia, is to be exchanged for a Bosnian Serb family held in Gorazde, the spokesman for the U.N. Protection Force (UNPROFOR) added. They are also holding his driver and a Moslem interpreter, REUTERS said. The spokesman could not say where the hostages had been taken or where they were being held, and what Bosnian Serb family was involved.

Serbs Release Aid Workers

AU2707103094 Paris AFP in English 1017 GMT 27 Jul 94

[Text] Geneva, July 27 (AFP)—Two UN aid workers detained by Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina were released unharmed Wednesday, a UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) spokesman said.

But they are refusing to return to the eastern town of Gorazde without the Muslim woman they were escorting there when they were stopped, said spokesman Ron Redmond.

He said: "The Serbs said they are free to go, but the lady is under UNHCR protection and they don't want to go without her."

The man and woman working for the UNHCR were escorting the Moslem woman on Tuesday when they were stopped at a checkpoint in the Serb- held town of Visegrad, some 30 kilometres (18 miles) northwest of the besieged Muslim pocket of Gorazde.

Redmond said: "The Serbs want someone to go out from Gorazde" in exchange for allowing her to go back in.

Separately he said the UN airlift into Sarajevo remained suspended Wednesday and could give no details as to when it might start up again. The airlift was stopped a week ago when five planes were hit by gunfire.

UNPROFOR 'Concerned' by Escalated Fighting

AU2607141594 Paris AFP in English 1404 GMT 26 Jul 94

[Text] Zagreb, July 26 (AFP)—The UN Protection Force [UNPROFOR] is "very concerned" by the escalation in

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fighting in Bosnia- Herzegovina, UN spokesman Paul Risley said here Tuesday [26 July].

The United Nations is "very concerned by the situation on the ground in Bosnia," he said, adding that "at numerous locations around Bosnia" there have been "higher levels of shelling and small arms fire than we have seen in recent days."

Risley added that the United Nations was "specially concerned by continued reports of heavy ground fighting along both the internal and the external confrontation lines in the Bihac pocket."

The fighting in Bihac was taking place both between the Moslem-dominated government forces and those of Moslem separatist leader Fikret Abdic inside Bihac, and between the government forces and Bosnian Serbs massed outside the pocket.

Risley said that outside Bihac the most intense fighting was in northern and central Bosnia.

The escalation in military activity in the Bihac pocket was leading to a "critical, to say the least," humanitarian situation because convoys were almost unable to get through, he said. Stocks were "very low" for both the population and UN personnel stationed in Bihac.

He said that faced with the worsening situation which has been "going on several weeks," the UN "may have to consider the possibility of air supplies" for the region.

Trebinje Serbs Threaten To Shell Dalmatian Towns

AU2607165694 Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 26 Jul 94 p 28

[Report by P.J.: "B. Vucurevic: 'We Will Shell Cilipi and Cavtat'"]

[Text] The president of the Trebinje commune, Bozidar Vucurevic, in a telephone conversation yesterday told BORBA that Croatian troops in positions around Hum and Popovo Polje had attacked villages around Trebinje with artillery shells. An alarm was sounded in Trebinje, but there were neither casualties nor any significant material damage in this attack. Such provocations by the Croatian Army have been almost continuous since Friday when a Serbian soldier, Jovan Kolak, from Trebinje was killed near Hum.

Vucurevic told us that the troops of the Herzegovina Corps had responded to this latest provocation with artillery fire at the area in and around Dubrovnik. Zagreb Radio reported that four artillery shells were fired from the positions of the Herzegovina Corps; however, it did not report where they landed.

President Vucurevic also stated that the command of the Herzegovina Corps had established a communication link with the Croatian Army to agree an immediate cessation of such provocations. If they do not stop, "the forces of the Herzegovina Corps will attack the airport in Cilipi or a tourist locality such as Cavtat."

"We have not been able to cultivate Popovo Polje for a very long time," Vucurevic warned, "which is practically our sole means of production. This is for us what tourism is for them. On top of all this they are constantly provoking, killing our people...."

Otherwise, last year's agreement, which was reached at the Debeli Brijeg border crossing, on the use of water from the Trebisnjica lake for Dubrovnik's hydroelectric power station in Plat is being fully observed. Trebinje is regularly supplying water, the hydroelectric station is working to full capacity, and Dubrovnik is regularly paying Trebinje for the water.

Serbs Reportedly Shell Srebrenica Protected Zone

AU2607182594 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 26 Jul 94

[Report by Srebrenica Press Center]

[Text] While the representatives of the Contact Group weigh the (essence) of the Serbian rejection of the proposed maps on the territorial partition of our country, paramilitary Serbian units from the direction of Bratunac and [word indistinct] have been violating on a daily basis Resolutions 819 and 420 of the Security Council relating to the protected zone of Srebrenica, as well as the agreement on demilitarization.

The massive infantry [word indistinct] and weapons from Velika Bradina have been firing at the outskirts of Potocari and Sutjeska. At 1900 [1700 GMT] yesterday, the aggressor from [word indistinct] shelled the area of Slatina, while the UN Protection Force watched.

Muslim Forces Launch Attack in Travnik Area

LD2707121794 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1051 GMT 27 Jul 94

[Text] Srbobran, 27 Jul (TANJUG)—Muslim forces have launched a strong artillery and infantry attack in the Javorak area in the southeastern part of the Vlasic front. Republic of Srpska army units are firmly holding their defense lines, and the fighting in this part of the front is still going on, the press center of the First [Bosnian Serb] Krajina Corps said today.

Muslim forces from Prusac and Kamenjas have been engaging in infantry provocations in Srbobran area. Muslims are bringing in and regrouping troops on this part of the front, particularly in the Sahman area, as well as along the Podripci-Drvetine road, where tank movements have been registered.

Mazowiecki: 'Brutal' Treatment of Civilians

AU2707111694 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1000 GMT 27 Jul 94

[Excerpt] The Bihac region is threatened by starvation and the humanitarian situation in catastrophic, UN

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human rights envoy Tadeusz Mazowiecki stated after his visit to Bihac. Nada Al Isa reports:

[Begin Al Isa recording] Mazowiecki emphasizes: I have visited both warring sides and their prisons. The difference between the prison in Bihac and the prison in Velika Kladusa is staggering. In the prison in Bihac, that is, in the area controlled by the 5th Corps of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army, there are no civilian prisoners. It is mostly criminals who are detained there and only two prisoners of war. However, Mazowiecki says, I was sickened by what I saw in the prison for civilians in Velika Kladusa. In Kladusa, he adds, there is a big detention (?camp) precisely for civilians. The situation in this prison is very bleak. Approximately 300 people are detained there, among them old and sick people, and even children. The treatment of these prisoners in the camp of Fikret Abdic is extremely brutal. One can see traces of torture on the people and they are in a dire state, Mazowiecki says.

[Word indistinct] an official document will reach the UN now, which will make it clear as to who is who in the Cazin Krajina. Namely, Mazowiecki himself has repeated at least three times what he had seen. [word indistinct] conditions for the war conditions in the prisons controlled by the Bosnia-herzegovina Army and extremly brutal treatment of the detained civilians in the camps of Fikret Abdic. [passage omitted] [end recording]

Catholic Archbishop Urges Reconciliation

AU2607153094 Split SLOBODNA DALMACIJA in Serbo-Croatian 20 Jul 94 pp 6,7

[Interview with Bosnian Roman Catholic Archbishop Vinko Puljic by Slavica Lukic in Sarajevo; date not given: "'The Most Vital Archbishopric Was Doomed to Extinction'"]

[Text] The consistency of Bosnian Archbishop Vinko Puljic has lately come under attack from the daily press of all colors and origin, even from the Croatian newspapers. He is reluctant to talk or says very little about that, and still firmly believes in the possibility of rebuilding trust between the three religious communities in Bosnia-Herzegovina. His recent meeting with President of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina Alija Izetbegovic might be a step forward in rapprochement. Furthermore, the archbishop has recently visited all the parishes of his war-torn archbishopric which could not be reached during the war at all, or only through amateur radio-telegraph operators. We conducted this interview at the seat of the Bosnian Archbishopric in Sarajevo.

[Lukic] President of the Presidency of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina Alija Izetbegovic has recently paid a call on you. Can you tell us more about your meeting?

[Puljic] It was a follow-up meeting. Assistant Archbishop Sudar and I sent a memorandum to President Izetbegovic expressing our concern and listing concrete problems that needed to be solved urgently. In his reply, Mr. Izetbegovic promised to examine the matter and take the necessary steps, and wrote that he was prepared to meet with us to discuss these problems. During our meeting, we talked about church life in areas controlled by the Bosnia- Herzegovina Army. We did not only discuss the lives of priests, but also the existential problems of ordinary people such as mobilization, the organization of a normal life, the safety of citizens, protection and retrieval of property, ways to protect national and religious identity, the possibilities for charitable activities, etc. The bishop and myself raised the issue of returning some buildings that belong to the church in Sarajevo, which we would like to use to organize schools and other activities this fall. Since the politicians gave up caring about Catholic Croats in these parts, the only thing left for us to do is to fight for our rights ourselves.

[Lukic] You have recently visited the area of Bosnian Archbishopric. Can you tell us about the situation there and compare the number of Catholic Croats and priests in the area before the war and at present?

[Puljic] In the past three months, I visited almost all the parishes in areas controlled by the Croatian Defense Council and the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army in which there are priests. In the first days of Lent, I also visited parishes in free areas of Bosanska Posavina. What I saw cannot be described with just a few words. I still have not quite recovered yet, for I was greatly distressed. The consequences of this war are terrible! I am reluctant to use numbers, because a person is not a number for me, but a living being deserving care and respect. However, to get at least some kind of picture, we must have numbers. When I took office, there were 205 ordained diocesan priests in the Bosnian Archbishopric and one-third of them worked outside the diocese. We had 180 Franciscan friars active in parishes or monasteries. Furthermore, there were about 400 nuns of various orders, but the number varied as a result of integral territory of provinces in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia. [sentence as published] That was the situation before the war.

Testimony

Today, on the territory of this archbishopric, there are about 80 active diocesan priests, about 100 Franciscan friars, and about 80 monks. In the last academic year, our archbishopric had about 50 seminarists in the small seminary, and about 40 theology students attended the faculty of theology. Unfortunately, the eastern-most, most vital, archbishopric was doomed to extinction in this war. We have been struggling to preserve the right to life. Two-thirds of the people have had to leave their homes, and almost two-thirds of our places of worship were leveled or heavily damaged. During the war, in the area of the archbishopric, three priests were killed and we do not have the exact number of casualties in our congregation. We are presently collecting and processing data from our parishes. Things are by far the worst in areas held by the Serbian Army. Terrible things happen in other areas as well. There is too much violence and too

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many uncontrolled masters of roads and areas. I would not like to list names before I have investigated the matter, especially because those people should account for robbery, most horrible types of trade, even drug trafficking.

[Lukic] In this war, you were accused by the Bosnian media. What did they reproach you for and how did you handle the accusations?

[Puljic] My views and those of the Bosnia-Herzegovina bishop, and those of my associates as well, are based on religion and morality, not on current or daily politics. At times, those consistent views of ours were a cause for the fickle daily press to make allegations, and politicians are aware that attack is the best form of defense. Those attacks tried to undermine what I was saying, for ordinary people had confidence in the clearly-defined views of the Church. They realized that I and my priests were defending their rights. I had neither the time nor energy to reply to most accusations, for action speaks louder than words. When I requested written proof of my alleged guilt, I was told it was all a mistake. I am aware of the fact that the horrible all-out blockade has its consequences. Many people spread lies and abuse the fact that this horror of war has left many people mourning. The situation is often so tragic that, influenced by small-time local leaders, people start blaming everyone with different views, even if it goes against the Gospel and the teachings of the Church. I have to give testimony about what I saw, and facts are most serious accusations. Still, my testimony does not aim at accusing anyone, but to point out the tragedy of war and help people realize their rights to life, home, work, dignity....

Bridges

[Lukic] You had several meetings with Reis-ul-ulema [supreme religious head] Effendi Selimoski during the war. To my knowledge, the new Naibu-reis [deputy supreme religious head] Effendi Mustafa Ceric leveled accusations against you on several occasions when he came to Sarajevo, and the relations with the Islamic community have been disturbed. Will you perhaps, after meeting with Izetbegovic, also meet with Mustafa Ceric and improve the relations between the two religious communities?

[Puljic] In Sarajevo, we tried to have good relations with the Islamic community and also with Reis Mustafa Ceric. The Catholic Church and Islamic community had different roles in this war. As archbishop, I never once gave any specific religious instructions to soldiers, nor have I allowed priests to get involved in the army. Priests have their own ways of serving people. Conversely, the administration of the Islamic community distributed some publications to Muslim soldiers, some of which contradict the teachings of the Catholic Church. The problem lies in the fact that many imams got involved in the army. That hindered our rapprochement. Reis had access to the Bosnia-Herzegovina media, and so did his associates from political circles. However, we must descend from political positions and start negotiating on religious viewpoints. The Church has always welcomed such talks and we can soon build new bridges. I tried very hard to be fair through charitable activities, as well as when various Catholic delegations visited Sarajevo.

[Lukic] What are your contacts with the representatives of Serbian Orthodox Church in Bosnia-Herzegovina?

[Puljic] I have tried to establish dialogue and meet with representatives of Serbian Orthodox Church. And I did so on several occasions in this war: on the international level in Switzerland, at Sarajevo Airport I met with Bosnian Metropolitan Mr. Nikolaj, and there was a meeting between Patriarch Pavle and Aleksei II and Cardinal Kuharic, whom I escorted. We have contacts with the active parish-rector of the Orthodox Church Father Avakum and with the retired priest Father Krstan. When our conversation is based on religion, we soon establish bridges to dialogue. However, as soon as we come to the subject of politics, I get the impression I am talking to a Serb politician.

Coexistence

[Lukic] After the war in these parts, many no longer think coexistence is possible between the three nations. At best, people say the three nations can live next to each other, but cannot coexist. Can you give us your view of the problem?

[Puljic] I think that exclusivism is a negative trait in human nature. The ghetto is not a healthy environment for development. It is not true that they cannot coexist, for most of them who say so actually think "God save Croatia, off I go to Germany." They are actually fleeing to places where they can earn more money and have better lives. It is understandable to an extent, but that cannot be applied as a standard for developing the views and thoughts of the Croats. Those very people who claim coexistence is impossible, work side by side with the Muslims and the Serbs in Austrian and German factories. Allegedly, coexistence is impossible here but they can work together abroad. An old proverb says that money will do anything. Of course, I do not identify the politics of ethnic cleansing and genocide with one nation. Bloodshed is an evil, but does that mean that so many people should be crossed out or sent to exile because we, allegedly, cannot live together? These are morbid ideas. We must heal all war wounds, even this one. All we have to do is to establish equality and the system that will preserve our identity and our share in the authorities. It is our destiny to remain and survive in these parts. Everyone has the right to remain where they were born and grew up. Consequently, we must find a way to make this work.

[Lukic] What do you reproach Croatian politics and politicians for? Do you think they were protecting the interests of their nation wisely in this war?

[Puljic] It is difficult to define all the problems and give a good answer to this question. I am having a hard time

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dealing with accusations. People tell me they feel like second-rate Croats, for some people label the extent of their Croatianness. Unfortunately, we were able to see that in the Croatian parliament as well. It hurts to be ignored by someone who is not of the same blood. But when you are ignored by your own kind, then it is much more painful. It is like a mother renouncing her own child. Many Croats were deeply hurt by statements of some parliamentary deputies in Zagreb who thought they had the right to say how Croatian we are or whether we are Croats at all. My message to them is loud and clear: we are both Croats and Catholics and we will remain that regardless of their statements. Still, if they do not want to help us, I ask them not to defend us in that way. Let them come to this blood-soaked land and prove their Croatianness. However, I must thank all those who understood and realized our suffering, and they are in the majority. I would like to thank all those who spoke up in favor of our survival. My special thanks go to those who took in such a great number of the humiliated refugees, deprived of their rights. We know there are such examples as well. I am grateful to all those who helped us endure our troubles whether materially or spiritually.

Croatian Schools

[Lukic] Can you comment on the possibility of founding special Croatian schools in Bosnia-Herzegovina?

[Puljic] We have been working on that for a long time now, for that is an important element in preserving national and religious identity. The Church and the Croatian Cultural Society "Napredak" [Progress] are doing the best they can to that end. I believe we could start with first schools in Sarajevo in the fall, with God's help and the help of good people, and then in other areas as well. I appeal to all good people to help us achieve that. Many just talk about it, without doing anything. We need action!

[Lukic] The Bosnian Sarajevo Faculty of Theology was moved to Bol on the island of Brac and the Sarajevo Franciscan Theology to Samobor near Zagreb. What will happen to them in future?

[Puljic] Bosnia-Herzegovina bishops and the administration of the Franciscan province of Bosna Srebrena have already decided to move the Bosnian and Franciscan Faculties of Theology back to Sarajevo as soon as possible. Preparations for the reconstruction of the building of the Bosnian Faculty of Theology is under way, and the Franciscans demand that their building be returned to them. We are also considering the forming of a joint faculty of theology, but that will take detailed preparations. For the time being, we cannot return to Sarajevo, but can only hope to come back to our seat in the near future.

[Lukic] What about the possible visit of the Holy Father to Sarajevo?

[Puljic] We expect him with joy and hope. He really wants to come. I believe he will come as soon as it is possible. We eagerly await the news and then we will get ready for his visit. We need the pope, the harbinger of peace, to bring us words of consolation and courage. We want and have the right to survive in these parts as an organized church. The mission church has its place and task here. The pope is coming both as the missionary of peace and as a man of God and we eagerly await him. God bless his arrival.

Criminal Charges Filed Against Lukic

94BA0355A Ljubljana DELO in Slovene 7 Jul 94 p 52

[Article by Slobodan Dukic: "Mafia Capitalism the Serbian Way"]

[Text] *Republic of Srpska interior minister Stanisic has accused prime minister Lukic and several members of Karadzic's government of robbing the state treasury of 3.5 million German marks [DM]; they are stealing everything that they can, from Golfs to wheat.*

From our correspondent.

Belgrade, 6 Jul—The leader of the Bosnian Serbs, the militant Dr. Radovan Karadzic, is calling the international community the mafia of the white world, but in his "state," the republic of Srpska, from which Muslims and Croats have been expelled, the biggest criminals are precisely in the government, according to Mica Stanisic, the minister of police. Among other things, he is also accusing Dr. Vladimir Lukic, Karadzic's prime minister, of directly costing the "state" 3.5 million marks.

The new "Karadjordje," who wants to overthrow Milosevic himself, suppressed the Banja Luka military uprising last year. Dissatisfied soldiers occupied the town for 10 days, and demanded that Karadzic deal with the war profiteers who were plundering while they were at the front. The leaders of the uprising were arrested, and Pale promised that it would be tougher on crime. Now news is arriving about that activity from the police minister himself, who says that Karadzic's closest associates are behind the crimes. In addition to the prime minister of the so-called republic of Srpska, the abovementioned Lukic, he is also accusing Branko Ostojic, deputy prime minister for the economy; Momcilo Pejic, governor of the National Bank; Petar Markovic, finance minister; and Branislav Zugic, secretary of the Ministry of Commerce.

The key thing in this affair is the claim by Karadzic's chief of police that the prime minister took DM3.5 million from the state treasury and used it to buy a certain enterprise in Bulgaria. It is the Naktar enterprise, and the intermediary in that transaction was a certain Dimitreshka Georgieva, owner of the Drustur Komerc enterprise in the Bulgarian town of Silistr. The police ministry says that prime minister Lukic participated in another transaction in which over DM5 million disappeared. Karadzic's prime minister used that money to

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purchase oil through two private businessmen, one of whom was Branko Ostojic, the deputy prime minister. The oil was not imported, but the money was not returned either; they claim that it ended up in a certain bank in Greece in the accounts of Branko Ostojic and Stavisa Krajisnik, a close relative of Momcilo Krajisnik, vice president of the republic of Srpska assembly. Lukic, along with Momcilo Pejic, governor of the National Bank, and Branislav Zugic also spônsored one more alleged purchase of oil through the Banja Luka private businessman Slavko Lalos, the owner of the Marking Eksport-Import enterprise, who received several million marks, but did not give any guarantee that he would buy the oil or return the money. That money also disappeared to somewhere unknown.

In response to all of this, the accused Lukic says that his police minister is trying to divert public attention from the fact that he ignored crime from the beginning of the war in Bosnia up until November 1992, when "everything possible had been stolen and when Stanisic was also the police minister in the government at that time." Accusations and counteraccusations are also succeeding each other in connection with the theft of 3,000 Golfs that disappeared after the arrival of Karadzic's army in Vogosce. The police minister says that that theft has been explained, that the individuals behind it are known, and that the police have filed charges but the prosecutors are not doing anything, because the government prevented the criminals from being brought before the court.

Before leaving for Geneva, Karadzic assembled his cabinet and sharply criticized the police minister for allowing the scandal to become public. It was explained to the public that "the military situation and the inhumane economic blockade facing our people put the republic of Srpska government in the unenviable position of seeking sensitive solutions to keep the economy functioning, but that does not reduce the obligation to respect the law." The ink on that announcement was barely dry when news came from Bileca that 100 railcars of wheat had disappeared after the municipal president's departure for the front. The authorities were warned about the theft, but the prosecutor's office in that town is under the control of the Bosnian Serbs, and does not even dare to blink, because the town is ruled by criminals. The president of the municipality says that he is helpless because "the country is in a situation of mafia capitalism."

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Tudjman Addresses Troops Following Exercise

LD2607215294 Zagreb HTV Television in Serbo-Croatian 1815 GMT 26 Jul 94

[Speech by Croatian President Franjo Tudjman at Croatian Army exercise in Dalmatia on 26 July—recorded]

[Text] Officers, noncommissioned officers, soldiers, marines, members of Croatia's Armed Forces, ladies and gentlemen, guests. It gives me immense pleasure as head of state and supreme commander to congratulate you on the exercise carried out by all the services of our armed forces. I congratulate and salute General Janko Bobetko, chief of the general staff, and Gen. Gotovina, commander of the operational zone, on the exemplary performance and organization of the exercise. This of course also applies to all other officers, noncommissioned officers, soldiers, and marines who took part in this exercise.

This exercise shows that Croatia today has modern armed forces, capable of carrying out even the most complex military and combat operations. As members of the Armed Forces, your task is to perfect your mastery of the martial skills.

The Croatian State leadership is pursuing peace-loving policies; we would wish to attain our national objective—the final liberation of every square inch of Croatian soil—in a peaceful way and with the help of the international community, the European Union, and the United Nations.

However, understandably if this is not possible, then you, the armed wing of the Croatian people, together with the entire Croatian nation, will be ready to complete the establishment of a free and independent Croatian State, and the establishment of its legal and constitutional system on every square inch of its territory.

We have the right to this as a free, sovereign, and independent nation, a nation whose state is internationally recognized today. We have the right to this in harmony with all international laws and conventions, and with all resolutions passed by the UN Security Council.

We, for our part, are continuing to do everything we can in order to make the opponent accept a peaceful solution. Our people and our refugees—and we still have some 400,000 refugees and expelled persons in Croatia—we have displayed enough patience with those who have taken up arms against the Croatian State and are keeping part of Croatia's state territory under occupation, to come to their senses and accept both international laws and the Constitution of the Republic of Croatia. They can still do it, and we and the international community are inviting them to do so.

UNPROFOR [UN Protection Force] came here as the UN peace force, and in the beginning it completed part of its task. However, it failed to fulfil the second part of its task, because the rebel Serbian forces prevented it, and because Belgrade carried out the occupation of our territory under the protection of the peace force. This situation is coming to an end. Either the integration of those territories into Croatia's constitutional and legal system will begin by peaceful means, or we will have to take all steps to which we are entitled as an independent state.

Of course, the circumstances are nowadays different from when we accepted the deployment of the peace forces in response to the aggression of the Yugo-Communist army of Serbia and Montenegro. Then we were, so to speak, almost bare-handed. Even an ordinary pistol or a hunting gun counted as a weapon in the hands of the Croatian man. Today, you have showed that we have all the weapons, all three branches of a military power—ground forces, air force, and navy—that we have both equipment and skill. As soldiers, noncommissioned officers, and officers, you have proved that you know how to handle you equipment, and that you know how to use tactical and operational combat weapons.

Furthermore, Croatia is no longer alone, as it was when they wanted to destroy it, and when they did not want to allow the creation of an independent and sovereign Croatia.

Today Croatia has its Armed Forces, but it also has allies and friends in the world. This is why the circumstances are now completely different from those in which we fought for the survival of the Croatian State and for the creation of the Croatian Armed Forces.

So, if the enemy continues to be so unreasonable as to defy not only Croatia, but also the whole of Europe and the world, they will have to feel the hand of both Croatia and the world because no one will allow them to occupy the territories to which they have no right.

I repeat, gentlemen, we will do everything to achieve this by peaceful means in order to spare victims, to spare our and your sons, brothers, and fathers from being killed and wounded. But the Croatian nation has proved its maturity and its ability to be prepared—in addition to political means—for everything that will be necessary, if it is necessary, to free the last inch of our country.

Gentlemen, I will take this opportunity to express my satisfaction and to congratulate the leadership, the officers, noncommissioned officers, and all the members of this training center. This training center is further proof of the current level of development of the Croatian Armed Forces. We can be proud of this training center, and I believe that there is no army in the world that would not be satisfied with it. The skills you displayed also speak of the courage and mastery of you, Croatian soldiers, officers, and noncommissioned officers.

I would like to take this opportunity to stress one more thing. I have often said that we managed to break away

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from the communist and Yugoslav hell by uniting Croatia at home and in the diaspora. I want to take the opportunity of being here for this military exercise and for the visit to the training center to stress once again that we would not have this army—neither its personnel nor morale or skill—if Croats in the diaspora, abroad, had not made their large contribution to it. They were driven from here and other parts of the Croatian homeland, but they returned and gave their homeland the knowledge and experience gained in foreign armies. They inspired a new spirit and passed on the know-how of foreign armies to our ranks. This is what many people forget, but this has been and remains the unity of Croatia at home and abroad, of all Croatian people, and classes. This unity is a guarantee for the successes we have achieved and for our future development.

Gentlemen soldiers, noncommissioned officers, and officers, Croatia is today internationally recognized and it has friends and allies. The democratic world needs us. The main international players need a stable Croatia to end the crisis in the territory of the former Yugoslavia—now especially in Bosnia-Herzegovina—and to create preconditions for a new international order in southeastern Europe, and Croatia is one of the main players and therefore, the democratic world needs it. This is the achievement of the whole of the Croatian nation, but primarily of the Croatian Armed Forces.

Let us be proud of it. Let us prepare for peace—for a lasting peace because that is what we want—but let us also prepare to fulfill our duty in the defense of our homeland tomorrow, if need be. Long live our only and eternal Croatia.

UNPROFOR To Contact UNSC Over Blockades

AU2607173794 Paris AFP in English 1719 GMT 26 Jul 94

[Excerpts] Zagreb, July 26 (AFP)—Croatian President Franjo Tudjman indicated Tuesday [26 July] Zagreb was prepared to use the army to regain control of Serb-held areas in the ex-Yugoslav state if the search for a peaceful solution failed. [passage omitted]

In a related development Tuesday, UN troops threatened Tuesday to call in the Security Council if a three-week blockade against them by displaced Croatians was not lifted quickly, saying they would have to leave Croatia if nothing was done.

Appealing to the Croatian Government to intervene, the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) repeated complaints that the action prevented them from carrying out their peacekeeping mission.

The UN force's mandate is due for renewal at the end of September.

A fresh meeting of Croatian government and UN representatives on the issue was expected in Zagreb Wednesday. [passage omitted]

RSK Urges Italian Involvement in Dispute Process

LD2607170594 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1621 GMT 26 Jul 94

[Text] Knin, 26 Jul (TANJUG)—Milan Martic, president of the republic of Serb Krajina [RSK], today sent a letter to Italian President Luigi Scalfaro, drawing his attention to the need for Italy's greater involvement in resolving the Croatian-Serbian dispute.

Martic stressed in his letter that the necessity for more intensive engagement stems from the fact that Italy, as opposed to the majority of European countries, is more objectively informed about all the current and historical aspects of the crisis in former Yugoslavia, and that, as a neighboring country, it is particularly interested in a peaceful and just denouement.

The RSK president particularly pointed to the undemocratic character of the Croatian State, and the fact that the consequences of Croatian State terror have been felt by both Serbs and Italians.

"We are convinced that, as the number one man of Italian political life and a confirmed democrat, and on behalf of the hundreds of thousands of expelled and disenfranchised members of your nation, you will fulfill your moral obligation to history and see to it that the Serbian people of the RSK are granted equal status in all debates in international organizations," the letter says.

Martic stresses in conclusion that this would help end the hitherto one-sided approach toward resolving the crisis, and would avoid an escalation of the war in the region of former Yugoslavia.

Warns Against NATO Entry

LD2607154394 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1409 GMT 26 Jul 94

[Text] Novi Sad, 26 Jul (TANJUG)—Commenting on Butrus-Ghali's letter, Milan Martic, president of the republic of Serb Krajina, told Novi Sad Radio today that "his invitation to NATO forces is certainly not in the interest of peace but of war."

Martic cautioned that such a war could not be confined to our areas and that it was very likely to spread to the entire Balkans, Europe, and even the world. This is a real danger, Martic stated, and added that "this letter is rather odd" and that "it is incomprehensible that a UN secretary general should demand the withdrawal of his forces and offer NATO forces.".

I believe everyone, including the heads of government and state who would send their forces to this area, is going to do some hard thinking as their return would be uncertain, Martic said.

As far as we Serbs are concerned, the president of the republic of Serb Krajina added, we are absolutely in favor of peace. This is what we have already told

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everyone, but any force that comes here to oppress the Serbs, even if they are NATO, will be treated as a force of occupation.

He said that these forces would not be seen as well-intentioned because they would come not with good intentions but with the aim of furthering war options [sentence as received].

This is primarily America's diktat and that of Germany, Martic believes. He does not believe that the Americans, whose defeats include Vietnam, and even Somalia and some other places, will easily venture into sending their marines to these lands.

This is because, Martic said, we are not a jungle nor are we savages. Our fighters hold their positions. They have the most powerful motive as they defend their homes. We would certainly not let anyone drive us out that easily.

There is another risk, the president of the republic of Serb Krajina said, of them regarding this as an opportunity to push the Turks or some other power into waging war for the United States or Germany.

In any case, Martic said, the arrival of NATO forces is not a good move as it would bring about a vast escalation of the conflicts.

Information on Mi-24 Combat Helicopters

94BA0358A Zagreb GLOBUS in Serbo-Croatian 3 Jun 94 p 7

[Article by Denis Kuljis: "Croatia Has a Heavily Armed Mi-24 HIND Helicopter Gunship!"]

[Text] The television picture broadcast on Monday, 30 May, by Croatian Television [HTV] revealed a closely held secret: Croatia possesses Mil Mi-24 antiarmor helicopters, better known by the NATO code name HIND! In a series of brief reports in celebration of the Croatian national holiday, that picture will undoubtedly arouse great interest on the part of analysts studying the strategic balance of power on the territory of the former Yugoslavia.

Inclusion of this type of helicopter in Croatia's defense system diminishes to a large degree the possibility of a strategic surprise with Serbian tanks penetrating at the most sensitive points of the defensive deployment of the Croatian armed forces.

An Example of Superior Military Equipment

Antiarmor helicopters like the Mil Mi-24 are intended primarily for defensive maneuver against rapid tank penetrations, armor wedges driven depthwise into the defense. Their basic purpose, then, is defensive. Addition of varied light armament on the military version of the combat helicopter also produces a very powerful and fast-moving platform for combat against small infiltrated terrorist groups in a zone outside military control. The recent slaughter of Croatian civilians near Daruvar vividly demonstrated the need to introduce this type of aircraft into police units, whose biggest problem in the immediate future will be combating various forms of Serbian terrorism.

Although the Mil Mi-24 does not belong to the last generation of combat helicopters, in this region, given the weapon systems used on our battlefields, this is an example of superior military equipment. In his memoirs Veljko Kadijevic, former chief of the General Staff of the former JNA [Yugoslav People's Army], boasted that in spite of the arms embargo he had reached an agreement with Soviet Marshal Yazov for the delivery of that type of helicopter to the JNA, which then devastated Vukovar, Osijek, and other Croatian cities. Whether the agreement for delivery at that time actually took place cannot be reliably concluded, but so far this type of aircraft has not appeared in the pictures on Serbian television.

In the wartime operation so far in Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Serbs have made extensive use only of the "Gazelle" antiarmor helicopters, which are armed with the old version of the Malyutka antiarmor missiles, which are guided to the target by a wire. Although on the brief picture from HTV it was not possible to see what guided missiles were on the Croatian HIND, it is well-known that this type of helicopter can carry the considerably more precise and deadly air-to-surface missiles that belong to the new generations of Russian antiarmor missiles.

Because of the special titanium shielding that protects the crew and the vital parts on the helicopter, the Mil Mi-24 is called a "flying battleship." The Mi-24 has four racks from which it can carry suspended containers with unguided antiarmor shells. It has a four-barrel cannon in the nose turret. It is used for offensive transport of assault infantry, and it was used in large numbers in the war in Afghanistan to carry members of Soviet elite forces SPECNAZ to key points and to the rear of mojahedin concentrations.

The third generation of combat helicopters in the armies of the Western countries and also the Russian Army, which recently has been equipped with Mi-28 helicopters, is no longer designed to carry troops, but only for assault missions and antihelicopter combat, but under the conditions of the Croatian battlefields, where maneuver of small commando forces has proved decisive, a helicopter like the HIND could have an extremely important role.

Soon the Chetniks Will Be Losing Sleep

The most modern version of the Mi-24 helicopter, designated HIND-D, was included in the armament of the Soviet Army in 1975. About 2,500 helicopters of this type were built in mass production and then included in armament. The power plant and transmission are an

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improvement of the basic type of the Mil Mi-8, a transport helicopter capable of carrying 28 passengers.

In addition to the pilot and gunner, there is also room in the cabin of the Mil Mi-24 for a rifle squad of 12 men and their equipment. They embark and disembark through the large door on the left side of the fuselage, in front of the short wing on which the racks for guided and unguided missiles are installed. In the helicopter's nose, there are two bulging glass canopies for the pilot and gunner with sighting plates of bulletproof glass. Beneath the gunner's canopy is a four-barrel 12.7-mm machine gun. When they were included in the Soviet Army's armament, the HIND helicopters were armed with AT-6 "spiral" antiarmor missiles weighing 90 kg and with a range of about 10 km and semiactive guidance. The caliber of the guided projectiles is 57 mm.

Western military analysts at that time described the Mi-24 as a "helicopter battle cruiser" and predicted that it would be used in combat to land an antiarmor squad equipped with missiles, at the same time providing it fire support with cannon fire and with assault actions against enemy armor.

Combat use in Afghanistan, however, revealed its vulnerability to modern surface-to-air missiles, although it is equipped with four or five passive radar sensors and infrared decoys. Two "Isotov TV-3-117 M" turbines, each with a power of 2,200 horsepower, provide it a cruising speed of 270 km/hr, while in a dive it develops a maximum of 335 km/hr. It weighs six and a half metric tons empty, 8.2 tons equipped, and about 12 loaded. The hovering ceiling is 1,500 meters, the radius of action about 450 km. The five-blade rotor with a diameter of 17 meters hangs over a fuselage that is all of 17 meters long and 4.25 meters high.

In the nose of the helicopter, there is an infrared sensing device and a laser sight, which means that the HIND is equipped to operate at night and in bad weather. The Croatian HIND is therefore "master of the night," and regardless of what unit it belongs to, the chetniks will in future be losing sleep in their forward positions and in their rear bases when they hear the distant rumbling at night and wonder whether it is bad weather or a "Croatian storm" which will carry them away?

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ΩEconomic Developments Examined

94P20998A

[Editorial Report] Aspects of economic development in The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) have been discussed in the Skopje Macedonian-language dailies NOVA MAKEDONIJA and VECER.

Number of Families Needing Assistance Tops Expectations

Writing in the 5 July issue of NOVA MAKEDONIJA, M. Zlatanovic noted that in the first three months of 1994, 45,916 families in FYROM qualified for social assistance. According to Dragan Tilev of the Ministry of Labor and Social Policy, the government had not expected to reach such a high number of poor families until the end of the year.

Meat, Hide Exports

The Gorni Polog enterprise in Gostivar earned about $3 million from meat exports during the first half of 1994. According to K. Kiproski in the 5 July NOVA MAKEDONIJA, 240 metric tons of lamb were sent to Italy and 200 tons to Croatia. Italy also purchased 140 tons of veal and 80 tons of cowhides. Turkey bought 104 tons of lamb skins and Slovenia 17 tons of cowhides. Nevertheless, Gorni Polog's general director, Rade Isakovski, pointed out that transportation had become a major problem; whereas before the breakup of Yugoslavia specialized trains could reach Italy in 30 hours, this spring the trip took six to seven days. For the past few years, Gorni Polog has been interested in canning and preserving technology for both domestic and foreign markets. The World Islamic Organization for Humanitarian Assistance (IGAOE) arranged for the export of 400,000 German marks' worth of preserved lamb. Since the foreign partner was satisfied with the meat's quality, he is expected to purchase another 400,000 German marks' worth by 31 August. Gorni Polog has begun to process pork, beef, and chicken preserves in cooperation with the Saturn company of Ljubljana, Slovenia.

Fenimak's Prospects Improve

With the rising price of nickel on the world market, currently $6.48 per kilogram, an increase of 44 percent in several months, the ferronickel combine Fenimak is working at full capacity, according to reports in NOVA MAKEDONIJA on 28 June and in VECER on 2-3 July.

Stopanska Bank Issues Bank Debit Card

The Stopanska Bank in Skopje has issued the first bank debit card in FYROM, according to an article by V. M. Bozinovska in the 27 June issue of VECER. The card is available to citizens with active accounts at the bank. They must deposit at least 500 German marks, for which they will receive 1 percent interest in denars monthly. They can then use the card to make cashless payments to authorized entities, including the 10 largest enterprises in FYROM.

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Federal

Grachev Calls Belgrade Talks 'Positive'

LD2607150394 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1415 GMT 26 Jul 94

[Text] Belgrade, 26 Jul (TANJUG)—Defense Minister Pavel Grachev has described as "positive" the talks he and Vitaliy Churkin, Russia's special envoy for the former Yugoslavia conducted today at the General Staff of the Yugoslav Army with National Defense Minister Pavle Bulatovic and Momcilo Perisic, chief of the General Staff of the Yugoslav Army.

Replying to a question from the press as to whether he believed that Butrus-Ghali's suggestion that replacing UNPROFOR [UN Protection Force] soldiers with NATO soldiers would bring peace to Bosnia, Grachev said: "This is the opinion of one man, although he may well be a UN secretary general. Every man is entitled to voice his opinion."

Speaking about today's talks, Grachev said that he and Churkin had exchanged views with Bulatovic and Perisic on the situation in Bosnia and that he and Minister Bulatovic had talked about future relations between the two countries.

Grachev said that one of the objectives of his visit to Belgrade was to present Presidents Slobodan Milosevic and Radovan Karadzic with Russian President Yeltsin's written message. Grachev did not want to say anything about the substance of the message.

Asked what he was going to suggest to Karadzic regarding the contact group's peace process, Grachev said that he could only convey his own opinion rather than any suggestions.

Vitaliy Churkin declined to talk to the press.

Brings Yeltsin Message

AU2607154694 Belgrade Radio Beograd Network in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 26 Jul 94

[News conference by Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev after his talks with FRY Defense Minister Pavle Bulatovic and Yugoslav Army Commander Momcilo Perisic in Belgrade on 26 July—recorded; Grachev speaks in Russian with simultaneous Serbo-Croatian translation; questions in Serbo-Croatian with simultaneous Russian translation; translated from the Serbo-Croatian; the overlapping translations and commotion from the audience make parts of the item unintelligible]

[Text] [Unidentified correspondent] What was the atmosphere like at the talks?

[Grachev] Positive, basically. Now I am to have talks with Serbian President Milosevic.

[Unidentified correspondent] What do you think about Butrus-Ghali's demand for the replacement of the UN Protection Force [UNPROFOR] by NATO?

[Grachev] That is a statement by an individual, even if he is secretary-general. That is his view. Every man has the right to his opinion, and he expressed his [words indistinct].

[Unidentified correspondent] What did you and Mr. Churkin talk about with Messrs. Bulatovic and Perisic?

[Grachev] We exchanged views about the situation in Bosnia. Mr. Minister [words indistinct]. We discussed our future contacts, between Russia and the Republic of Serbia [as heard].

[Unidentified correspondent] The aim of the visit?

[Grachev] [words indistinct] leadership. First, meeting with the military leadership to discuss our future (?by orders) of Russian President Yeltsin [words indistinct] Milosevic and Karadzic [words indistinct] to hand them his message. I have not read the contents yet. Third, to tour our battalion of the peacekeeping forces [words indistinct] how they live, how they work.

[Unidentified correspondent] Mr. Grachev, what will you (recommend) to Radovan Karadzic in connection with the peace plan?

[Grachev] [words indistinct] no pressures will be exerted [words indistinct].

Ministry Official on Butrus-Ghali Statement

LD2607181594 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1749 GMT 26 Jul 94

["Pool" item]

[Text] Belgrade, July 26 (TANJUG)—Yugoslav Ambassador in the Foreign Ministry Branko Brankovic said Tuesday that any idea of NATO's arrival to replace U.N. Protection Force [UNPROFOR] or to have any other mandate meant a pressure on the Serbs to unconditionally accept the entire "Contact Group" plan for Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Commenting on U.N. Secretary General Butrus Butrus-Ghali's suggestion that NATO or other international forces might replace U.N. peacekeepers in the former Yugoslavia, Brankovic said this implied that the U.N. Security Council should make a decision to this effect.

It should not be forgotten that Russia is a permanent U.N. Security Council member and that it has the right to veto, Brankovic told Radio Jugoslavija.

Russian Defence Minister Pavel Grachev said in Belgrade on Tuesday that Russia was against Butrus-Ghali's suggestion. He also said that NATO was not a peacemaking organisation and that only UNPROFOR could accomplish the mission of preserving peace in the former Yugoslav Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

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Brankovic pointed to NATO's intentions to become a world policeman to implement decisions relating the new world order.

Regrettably, the new world order is being modeled after some precedents set in the crisis in the former Yugoslavia, Brankovic said. If this should serve as a basis, he added, it will result in new conflicts of much larger proportions, with Bosnia-Herzegovina having been the first testing ground.

Jovanovic Says Pale Favors Contact Group Plan

AU2607162294 Belgrade VECERNJE NOVOSTI in Serbo-Croatian 22 Jul 94 p 2

[Report on interview with FRY and Serbian Foreign Minister Vladislav Jovanovic by Rade Brajovic and Radmila Dubljevic; place and date not given: "Independence Is More Important Than Maps"]

[Text] The response of the Serbian Republic Assembly to the proposal of the Contact Group is a clear determination for a peaceful concept of the resolution of the Bosnian crisis. For this reason, any attempt to belittle the significance of the Serbian Parliament declaration would mean an attack on the peace process.

FRY Foreign Minister Vladislav Jovanovic, among other things, said this in an interview to Rade Brajovic, chief editor of VECERNJE NOVOSTI, and Radmila Dubljevic, future Beijing correspondent of this paper.

According to Jovanovic, the Serbian Republic's response is absolutely positive because it is affirmative regarding the peace process.

"This positiveness emanates from every word, even concerning the maps are concerned. Let us not forget that the Serbian Republic has proclaimed a unilateral cessation of hostilities on several occasions, which no other side in the conflict has done. For this reason, the Serbs in Bosnia cannot be castigated as the side that opposes peace," Jovanovic emphasized. "Therefore, the declaration means absolute support for a peaceful and political resolution of the crisis, which involves a lasting and fair solution and not a half-baked, temporary solution. In this sense, I also see certain elements of concern for the remaining elements of the peace plan to be resolved simultaneously. These elements are: definition of the constitutional position of the Serbian Republic in relation to the Muslim-Croatian Federation, the Bosnian Serbs' right to enter into a confederation with Yugoslavia and Serbia, the possibility of access to the sea, the status of Sarajevo, firm guarantees for the lifting of sanctions...."

Painful Sacrifices

Convinced that peace is without an alternative for everyone, Vladislav Jovanovic then said:

"Peace has no alternative, not only for the Serbs in Bosnia but also for foreign factors, with the exception of a group of radical Islamic countries that would like to fish in the dark in the former Yugoslavia. For this reason, I would call on the Contact Group not to miss a chance for a speedier resolution of problems."

When asked whether he believes that such a belief has matured in the European diplomacies, Minister Jovanovic replied:

"If it has not, then it must. No one has yet praised the proposed maps as being ideal, the best. A proposal itself cannot bring back peace and guarantee a lasting safety if it is not coordinated with other solutions. The Serbian Republic can be offered a bigger piece of territory; however, if its independence and rights to decide where and with whom it will live are restricted and if the authority of the Serbian people on these territories is made symbolic, then a proposal of such maps would not be acceptable. Therefore, reasonableness, an open mind, and an interest to put an end to the war should inspire everyone to look further to see better than we do."

What will happen to the 13 Serbian communes that, according to the existing proposal, should go to the Croatian-Muslim Federation?

"Every civil war is painful; therefore, this latest one cannot be painless," Jovanovic replied. "In this case, any political solution represents a reasonable compromise. The acceptance of the final settlement secures gains parallel to certain sacrifices. For this reason, it is expected from everyone (political leaders, individuals, and the entire nation) to take a stance toward the final political solution in which individual or group interests would lose their significance.

"What must be ceded," Minister Jovanovic emphasized, "should be perceived as an investment into future, into a lasting and stable peace. This is worth the sacrifice because it does not pay to have too many ambitions if they cannot be realized."

Clearing of the Fog

Differing reactions of the United States and Russia toward the decision of the Serbian Republic Assembly were evident. How many chances does this pose for us?

"Neither the FRY nor the Serbian Republic are playing on the differences of opinions or interests among the Contact Group members," Jovanovic replied. "Such a game would be shortsighted and short lived. We are playing on all the arguments that promote a just peace. We expect that they will all equally encourage the peacekeeping activities of the FRY and the Serbian Republic."

The latest diplomatic events concerning the former Bosnia- Herzegovina confirm the theory that Yugoslav diplomacy has helped the peace process from the beginning of the Bosnian crisis and that the sanctions have proved to be unjust. Therefore, how realistic is it to expect their imminent lifting?

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"The fog that has enveloped us is clearing considerably. Those who placed it over us are helping to clear it—Carrington, Owen, Mitterrand, Clinton, and Baker. They pointed at Germany as the prime culprit and the some individuals are already admitting their guilt in the premature recognition of Bosnia-Herzegovina. There are observers who now view and understand the vilification of the Serbian people much more realistically.

"Regarding the sanctions, understanding the truth has contributed toward distancing one from the sanctions, even in the United States, who had previously favored their extension. The United States now also accepts that, with the end of the war in Bosnia, the sanctions will also go. We have every reason to believe that the dynamics of the lifting of the sanctions will be coordinated with the pace of implementing the peaceful solution, regardless of the obstruction by the Muslim-Croatian side."

A Minor Movement

You have returned from a long tour of Africa. To what extent was the tour in the function of returning the FRY to the Nonaligned Movement?

"The recent tour, together with the previous one which entailed 10 countries of black Africa, had several objectives," Minister Jovanovic said. "One of the goals was to clarify our status in the Nonaligned Movement. We have encountered general dissatisfaction with our status, as well as disproval, for the stance of the Islamic countries, which have contributed the most toward it."

"The negative role of the radical Islamic countries is manifested in their cooperation with the international superpowers, cooperation on the goals that are contrary to the principles and the policy of the Nonaligned Movement. We have encountered similar dissatisfaction earlier in other countries, for example, in India. All this testifies that the world is nevertheless growing aware of our peace-loving policy. The feeling of need for a better organization of the truly nonaligned countries is, therefore, growing in the world. We expect that parallel to the resolution of the Yugoslav crisis and the truth about the destruction of Yugoslavia as a Nonaligned country, the Nonaligned will organize themselves to revitalize the movement, even if the number of its members will reduce," Minister Jovanovic concluded.

[Box 1, p 2] Declaration

How would your write a reply to the contact group proposal?

"Using the same elements, I would first put: That the proposed maps are in principle acceptable but adding that the overall final solution, in order for to be a just and a lasting one, must also include consent on other essential elements of this solution. These are: the constitutional order, the question of Sarajevo, the exchange of territories, access to the sea, guarantees for abolition of sanctions according to an established time schedule. However, if one examines the contents of the declaration by the Serbian Republic parliament carefully one can easily conclude that its essence is a peaceful one and that for this reason the declaration cannot be assessed any differently than a concrete contribution to the continuation and strengthening of the peace process."

[Box 2, p 2] Premeditated

Asked about the prospects of the Muslim-Croatian Federation, Minister Jovanovic replied:

"This federation is a marriage of convenience imposed from the outside. It will last as long as the reasons for the acceptance of this solution will exist on the inside and the outside. I personally do not believe in the longevity of these reasons, especially after the accomplishment of the solution for Bosnia."

Kontic Expects Results From Visit to Ukraine

LD2707090094 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 0748 GMT 27 Jul 94

[Excerpt] Belgrade, 27 Jul (TANJUG)—Ukraine can play a significant role in Yugoslavia's reintegration into the international community, Federal Prime Minister Radoje Kontic told reporters in Belgrade today before his departure for a working visit to Ukraine at the invitation of Ukrainian Prime Minister Vitaliy Masol.

"I expect friendly and constructive talks, and I am confident that this visit will contribute to the development of comprehensive bilateral cooperation between our two states," Kontic said. "In cooperation with our other friendly neighbors, Ukraine, which has also been affected by the sanctions, can play an important role in the effort to reintegrate Yugoslavia into the international community," Kontic said.

The first group of issues that Kontic will discuss with his host is linked to the currently culminating crisis in former Yugoslavia and to the work of the contact group, Kontic said. He added that Ukraine could play an important role by continuing to "oppose military and other intervention and by supporting a peaceful, political solution to the crisis—something that the Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia has also been advocating. [passage omitted]

Markovic Attacks VANITY FAIR Article

94BA0354A Belgrade DUGA in Serbo-Croatian 11-24 Jun 94 pp 10-11

[Article by Dr. Mira Markovic, wife of Slobodan Milosevic, professor of sociology at Belgrade University, and member of the Executive Committee of the Yugoslav Committee of the League of Communists-Movement for Yugoslavia: "A Lady on the Threshold of the 21st Century"]

[Excerpts] *A lady is a woman who has achieved the highest level in the areas in which her gender is expressed. The areas in which the feminine gender is expressed in*

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1994, however, have expanded in comparison with the Middle Ages and in comparison with the last century. Awareness of oneself as a lady, according to the criteria that were valid in the last century, expels the modern woman from any game.

26 May

Today DUGA came out, and in it parts of an article published in the U.S. journal VANITY FAIR were published. I was least of all surprised that that article was published in DUGA, because the following events preceded its appearance in the U.S. press.

At the beginning of March, I received a suggestion from the Ministry of Information that it would be good for me to receive reporter Bela Stambo, who writes for the illustrated and highly rated U.S. magazine VANITY FAIR, and who is friendly toward Serbia and the Serbian people. I accepted without thinking about it much, since in the last two or three years I have received a large number of foreign reporters, especially from the West, and talked with them without any sort of "protection" by the state and without any such recommendations. Until now, I have not regretted it. All those contacts of mine with foreign reporters were mostly good. They behaved professionally, and I was sincere. After all, I did not expect contacts with high-level journalism, with serious reporters, to be any different.

I had not heard of this publication previously. When the Ministry of Information suggested that I agree to an interview, I found out that the newspaper was not strictly a political one, and that it was of a popular nature, although it also contained political articles.

In parallel with that suggestion (from the Ministry of Information), however, I also received another suggestion. It came from DUGA. I was warned not to agree to an interview for that newspaper, because the reporter I was supposed to receive was in a certain way a guest of and under the influence of a DUGA reporter who had a negative attitude toward my husband and toward official policy in Serbia, and so that animosity would also be transferred to me, and thus become decisive for the formation of this U.S. reporter's positions. I rejected that possibility—why would animosity toward my husband be extended to me? Even if the same people do not like us, why should the same people hate us?

The person from DUGA I talked with was insistent, however. He warned me that the U.S. reporter was more or less rarely sober—"She drank up all the cognac I had in the house." I did not even attribute any significance to possible alcoholism—it is well-known that many reporters drink a lot, and are still good observers and commentators, often excellent reporters. So why couldn't this reporter be like that, even if she drank?

And thus I accepted the suggestion from the Ministry of Information and not the warning from DUGA. The reporter whom I received in March was very disorderly when she arrived, but I did not have the impression that she was not sober. She was really "rooting" for the Serbs, as if she had come from Pale and not New York. And she really was furious about current U.S. policy. She condemned U.S. policy toward Iraq, Haiti, and Serbia, and even elsewhere—she expressed bitterness over U.S. interference in other countries, its arbitration in the international community, its tendency toward domination in the modern world, and so forth. I thought to myself that this bitterness toward U.S. policy was a little overdone, perhaps with the purpose of establishing contact with me more easily. It was unnecessary, however, since I have also talked with reporters who did not support Serbia and did not condemn the United States, and I was not more curt and superficial and less sincere because of that. On the contrary, I behaved equally seriously and courteously with everyone, regardless of differences of opinion; although perhaps this anger over U.S. policy on the part of the reporter I received was sincere, and perhaps she is a sort of opposition there. I had the impression that she agreed with many things that she heard from me during the interview, most of which did not even have to do with the "Serbian question."

I received her once more for a photograph session. On that occasion, she asked me if she could meet my husband for at least a few minutes, to ask him two or three questions. I asked my husband to receive her for those few minutes and to answer her two or three questions. He did this for me, naturally. Later, the reporter contacted me twice in letters from Belgrade, once to thank and praise me, and the second time to ask me for one more contact with me and my husband. Neither of us was able to receive her again. I thus thought that I would never hear of her or that newspaper again. The translation of the article published in that newspaper, however, filled the pages of several Belgrade newspapers all last week. When I read that article, that well-known experience that a half-truth is worse than a lie occurred to me, because both of us received her and both of us talked with her, my husband very briefly and I for a rather long time. From those few minutes with him, she created several pages of text in which, lacking questions and answers, she described the furniture in his office and how she got coffee, and what she assumed he was thinking while he uttered a few conventional sentences. Since her time was limited to a few minutes and she did not have the opportunity to hear what he thought about the subjects that interested her and write about it for her newspaper, she wrote for her newspaper what she assumed he was thinking. She also wrote about who she assumed was telephoning him during the conversation with him, and what she assumed he was being told in the telephone conversation.

In the part of the article that deals with me, what she saw and heard, she presented it as she wanted to see and hear it. Fortunately, in my own country I write a lot about my political and other views, and so readers can thus see that the nonsense published in VANITY FAIR is not my opinion. I naturally regret the U.S. readers whom I am

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unable to tell that everything in the interview with me was different from what was published in their newspaper. I am not even very angry at that reporter, however. If I have given 20 interviews to foreign reporters and in those contacts always encountered a high level of professionalism, I cannot get angry at the 21st contact in which that professionalism was absent. That is a risk that cannot be avoided.

I do not know whether it was because of the influence of the DUGA reporter, or because of the influence of alcohol, or because of the influence of something else that more or less everything in that VANITY FAIR was a half-truth or falsehood. From the political views attributed to me, to trivial things that I did not say (for example, that I did not give interviews to women's magazines—I gave one to the only one in Belgrade that asked me for one, ZENA), to my appearance—I did not wear a black suit, but rather a multicolored skirt.

All in all, the warning that I received from DUGA in March was justified. I made a mistake because I trusted the suggestion from the Ministry of Information more than the warning from DUGA. I am only surprised that DUGA published the VANITY FAIR article; and how can I explain the fact that DUGA published an article whose malice and unprofessionalism I was warned about in advance by DUGA itself with the intention of preventing such an article from appearing at all? Since the source of that possible malicious and unprofessional attitude was at DUGA itself, that warning was realistic, and since that kind of article saw the light of day after the interview with me, that warning was justified. The only thing that is unclear is whether the DUGA editorial board's policy is conducted by malicious and unprofessional forces, or those who condemn them. Judging by the latest issue, it is the former, unfortunately.

And the U.S. reporter, manipulated in Belgrade or independent, with an opposition or loyal attitude toward U.S. policy, drunk or sober—it does not matter; she did not behave professionally. That is the first time I have had such an experience with foreign reporters, and I have had a lot of meeting with foreign reporters. [passage omitted]

4 June

From the caricatured interview that I gave for the illustrated U.S. magazine VANITY FAIR, the following sentence has been particularly quoted during the last few days: "A woman who wants to be a lady will never become a person" (or human being). When I said that the article was half-true, I also had that sentence in mind. It is true—I said that. But... before that I explained what I meant by the concept of a "lady." Without that previous explanation, one can easily conclude that I meant that women, for the sake of equality with men, should be slipshod, sloppy, coarse, and mannish. One could hardly conclude that from everything that I have publicly said and written to date. A malicious and unprincipled interlocutor, however, could also publish an article portraying me as a Serbian nationalist, monarchist, and religious believer; but it is precisely to the extent that I advocate restoration of the monarchy that I also urge women, in the name of equality with men, to stop caring about their dress and hairdos.

In order for that equality to be really established, however, women have to free themselves from the sphere of dress and hairdos as the zones in which they are fulfilled, as the zones in which they become ladies when they reach world standards. In the real sense, a lady should be a woman who has reached the highest level in the areas in which her gender is expressed. For centuries those areas in which the feminine gender has been expressed have had to do with the house, the family, children, husband, clothing, and adornment. A lady was a woman who was beautifully dressed, tolerant, sensitive, patient, and capable of only elementary and superficial conversation.

Everything has changed, however. The areas in which the feminine gender is expressed in 1994 have expanded in comparison with the Middle Ages and even in comparison with the last century, and even in comparison with the middle of this century. Those areas today, in addition to the family, dress, and adornment, are work outside the home, education, information, politics, a professional career.... In 1994 a lady, therefore, is a completely different woman: educated, informed, employed, healthy, neat, ambitious—and beautifully dressed and made up, naturally, someone who has self-respect, and who is respected by others, not just because the colors of her earrings and shoes match and she uses fashionable perfume, but also because of her work and knowledge, because of her views and behavior, because of those values by which a man is appreciated or not appreciated. Awareness of oneself as a lady, according to the criteria in effect in the last century, expels a modern woman from any game. Behavior in accordance with those criteria, at the present time, makes a woman ridiculous. Unfortunately, those criteria are still current. Social inertia is nowhere as tenacious as in relations between the sexes, and as tenacious as with respect to the status of women. Isn't still a widespread phenomenon that women consider themselves to be ladies if they appear in society with modern and beautiful clothes and hairdos, while at the same time they accept a segregation according to which they are placed in a zone in which they sit by themselves, talking about children, food, and dresses, while their husbands talk in the next room about business and politics, although also about soccer?

A lady in the second half of the 20th century is a woman who opens the door and crosses the threshold between those two zones—feminine and masculine—and stepping into the masculine one, becomes permanently indispensable in it. That long-standing masculine zone thus ceases to be a masculine one and becomes a human one. And the new woman, a real lady, finally becomes—a human being.

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Communism Growing in Serbia, Montenegro

94BA0355A Ljubljana DELO in Slovene 5 Jul 94 p 6

[Article by Branko Jokic: "The Comintern in Belgrade Again"]

[Text] *In the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia [FRY], communism is considered to be obvious in and of itself; numerous authoritative opinions that the Serbian-Montenegrin authorities have not only not tried to abandon communism, and instead, sooner or later, it is even their destiny.*

From our correspondent.

Podgorica, 4 Jul—The fear of communism and Bolshevism has not only never left the Serbian-Montenegrin spirit and area, but also has increasingly stronger support here and is growing increasingly stronger. That can best be seen from the maintenance of the "socialist-self-management" structure of the system and the authorities; the sole weakness of that Bolshevist obstinacy is that it does not have an international dimension, i.e., the current headquarters of the Belgrade Comintern is of only local significance and influence....

Such statements are being expressed not only by many foreign observers of the present Serbian-Montenegrin antibureaucratic orientation, but also by the its own most serious analysts. Belgrade historian Dr. Milan St. Protic recently stated that "The Serbian-Montenegrin state has by no means ended the era of communism," and that the communists have only concealed themselves for a while or are trying to change outwardly, but have essentially remained the same. The leading parties in Serbia and Montenegro (the Socialist Party of Serbia and the DPS [Democratic Party of Serbia]) have made only a cosmetic improvement by changing their names, and they were not able to conceal their real (communist) faces for long.

In any case, it is true that in Serbia and Montenegro today, communism is considered to be something that is obvious per se. There are a large number of communist parties that operate publicly and sometimes apparently do not agree on everything, but they have the same goals: In terms of common assumptions, they are linked by a powerful communist lobby, i.e., some sort of headquarters in Belgrade. Those centers operate in public, but they are also secret. Their headquarters is supposedly in Slobodan Milosevic's apartment on Dedinje, and their ideologue is his wife Mirjana Markovic who coordinates the LC-Movement for Yugoslavia. She has a great deal of influence over the appointment of her sympathizers to the power structures in Serbia and Montenegro, and people likewise think that she had the most say in the appointment of Veljko Knezevic, one of the leaders of her party, as ambassador to Zagreb. She also took that kind of action in the appointment of Borislav Mikelic as prime minister in Knin, even though the Serbian authorities have banned the activity of communist parties in that area. Another member of the leadership of the LC-Movement for Yugoslavia is Bratislava Buba Morina, widow of the already forgotten Kosovo politician Rahman Morina, who was recently appointed high commissioner for refugees in the Serbian government. Enormous amounts of money go through that institution, the routes for which are unknown, and consequently the communists' interest in its successful operation are not coincidental.

Formally, the head of the LC-Movement for Yugoslavia is Dr. Dragomir Draskovic, in the office of president, who says that "Naturally the authorities are appointing people with a left-wing orientation to offices." He explains the popularity of his party, which he calls a phoenix even though it only received a few tens of thousands of votes in the last elections, in terms of the activity of Dr. Mira Markovic, who did not only visit towns in Serbia and Montenegro to promote her book, but also recently Russia, Bulgaria, and several other countries, where her *"Answers"* has allegedly already become a success. Dr. Draskovic claims that his party has also spread throughout Slovenia and Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia] (some people think that it is true and that former politicians are heading those branches), and that the party's power lies in the "democratic" ideas represented by Dr. Mira Markovic.

In the magazine DUGA, Mira Markovic explained that there was no Bolshevism at all in Yugoslavia and that she had convinced many foreigners of this—in contrast to the domestic Doubting Thomases. She firmly asserts that there is no possibility of a Bolshevist system in Yugoslavia, but that nevertheless "the people have the right to live in the kind of system that they want." The Serbian-Montenegrin people, she says, have chosen a civil society, which is now in the initial stage of development, but at any rate it is neither Bolshevist nor socialist. To anyone who would declare that society a Bolshevist one, Dr. Markovic promises a "Nobel prize for cynicism"; she claims, in fact, that a Bolshevist system has never existed in Yugoslavia. Among other things, she also said this: "Eastern Europe has lived on the wrong road for more than half a century. In 1991, it crossed from one wrong road to another."

The well-known political dissident Vlado Dapcevic, for many years a prisoner after the war, is called in Yugoslavia "a walking legend of Montenegrin communism." Three years ago, he tried to restore communism and is still devoted to that idea, but is very critical of the parties of that provenance that now exist publicly or secretly. To be sure, he is secretary of the Party of Labor, which he told the weekly MONITOR is one with the people who are trying to get rid of fascism. Regarding the other communist parties, he says: "Parties like the LC-Movement for Communism, the New Communist Movement, and so forth are leftist in name only, but are essentially right-wing and branches of the regime and the police. Those parties are exploiting the fact that many people, especially in Montenegro, long for communism.

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Dr. Mira Markovic's party represents the Greater-Serbian positions, and with its help she and her husband have only divided up roles."

Dapcevic, an indisputable "martyr of the communist idea," even claims that there is no organized communism in Yugoslavia, and so he expects its expansion. Fortunately, he anticipates that even a century will be needed before communism will take over the world. Historian Dr. Protic also thinks that that idea is not harmless and that the statement by Montenegrin writer Jevrem Brkovic (who is now an emigre) that "Stalin's last mustache was shaved" in Montenegro is not optimistic at all.

Slobodan Milosevic's Dedinje gang will have an important "educational-reforming" role in the reincarnation of full communism. Even his son Marko said in a certain interview that his favorite reading was Marx's *"Das Kapital,"* and that he considered himself a communist. His father Slobodan certainly does not talk about any "revolutionary ideas"—it was only at the beginning of his career that he praised the personality and career of Josip Broz.

Milosevic's "apprentices" in Podgorica, however, are persistently flirting with the Goli Otok association, which Vlado Dapcevic claims was established in order to serve the authorities; that claim has already been proven true in practice. The Montenegrin authorities first of all rehabilitated the prisoners on Goli Otok, and then helped them to establish the association. Now they are financing its activity and attending various ceremonies, including the opening of the monument to Arso Jovanovic, former chief of the General Staff of the NOVJ [People's Liberation Army of Yugoslavia], who was not even on Goli Otok at all, but was instead killed on the Serbian-Romanian border when he tried to desert. The cooperation of the authorities and the former Goli Otok inmates is useful for both sides—the authorities are counting on the support of a significant number of voters and the public, since it is known that most of the people on Goli Otok were Montenegrins, and their families are now prominent on the political scene and are grateful to the "young revolutionaries" because they "removed the disgrace from their fathers, brothers, relatives, and friends."

In any case, there are also many authoritative political and scholarly opinions that the Serbian-Montenegrin authorities have not only not tried to abandon communism, but that it is also their destiny. And, of course, the destiny of the people in that state....

'Biodiesel' Production Deemed Profitable

94BA0344D Belgrade EKONOMSKA POLITIKA in Serbo-Croatian 20 Jun 94 p 23

[Article by V. Stevanovic: "New Technologies: Biodiesel Fuel From Baric"]

[Text] One can well imagine that today the first reaction of the moderately well-informed domestic farmer to the assertion that a metric ton of diesel fuel can be obtained from a 1-hectare field planted to rape would be a swear word. Whether that will be the case next year as well depends to a large extent on a project that Prva Iskra of Baric entered into relatively recently. Last September, they decided to employ their own unused capacities with a technology new to us: production of diesel fuel from plants. In the meantime, they have achieved commercial production, to be sure, a modest 1,200 tons, of biodiesel fuel: That is the amount for which the raw materials were supplied. Coming months will show whether this project will remain just a good business idea or will experience expansion.

An Old Idea That this is not just a political propaganda move in the style of "the sanctions cannot hurt us," Sava Popovic, M.A., project director, illustrates with figures on production of biodiesel fuel in "poor" countries such as France, Germany, Italy, Austria.... In France, the annual production of this environmentally clean fuel is about 600,000 tons, and the trend is toward the magic million, Italy is producing about 200,000 tons, Germany about 100,000 tons, and Austria between 50,000 and 100,000 tons.

The idea of diesel fuel of plant origin is actually fairly old: Way back in 1900, Rudolf Diesel developed his first engine for a fuel based on castor oil. The engine was later adapted to the type of fuel (petroleum), and then, following the energy crisis in the first half of the 1970's, people began to think about fuels (and energy) from renewable sources. The limit of the dreams is for every state to meet half of its energy needs from renewable sources, a challenge which for the present has been met most successfully by Norway (63 percent).

Another reason for diesel fuel of plant origin is the environmental component, which, to be honest, has not been dominant in our case. But arable land, which is probably the only comparative advantage we have, is good reason for the hope that the project will not fail. Truncated Yugoslavia has 2.7 million hectares of plowland. The average yield of rapeseed is 2,600 to 2,700 kg per hectare, whose processing yields a ton of diesel fuel. If, then, only 10 percent of the arable land was planted to this crop, this would be the source of raw materials to produce 100,000 tons of biodiesel fuel. Why rape? Sava Popovic explains that in principle biofuel can be obtained from any oilseed (soybeans, sunflower seed, castor beans, peanuts), but rape is the best, because it yields the best results from the work invested, and it is not so fussy about the quality of the soil. The varieties raised in our country at the moment yield about 40-percent oil, but varieties containing up to 50-percent oil are well-known in the world. Because rape is a crop with a modest tradition in Serbia, it is not unimportant to have optimum seed selection for this climate. This is already being done on the fields of the PKB [Beograd Agroindustrial Combine], which has been working on this project with Prva Iskra from the beginning.

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The State Is Standing Aloof

Of course in the whole story about biodiesel fuel one detail is perhaps the most important—the production cost. Our informant acknowledges that it is somewhat higher than the price of the fossil fuel, but he notes that feasibility studies done before they undertook the project showed that the production of diesel fuel from rape is altogether profitable from the economic standpoint. They examined three versions: production of 20,000 tons, production of 50,000 tons, and production of 100,000 tons.

The middle version (production of 50,000 tons of diesel fuel and a processing capacity of 130,000 tons of rapeseed) shows the following economic calculation. The analysis assumed that the land had not been prepared at all (from relations in property law to the entire infrastructure) and they took the extreme case of investment with the highest burden. If the investment is undertaken with one's own capital, it yields a return in two and a half years. If half of the investment capital is internal and half is credit, the investment pays off in five years, and if the bank has a share of 70 percent in the capital, which is the most frequent case in our country, the investment will be entirely paid off in seven and a half years. An interest rate of about 19 percent, which was in effect at the time, was taken as a parameter, and the amortization life of a factory of that kind was taken at 10 years. In other words, the risk on the capital investment is reduced to zero. Aside from the fuel obtained from domestic sources, other incentives in this kind of investment project lie in the increased employment, the raw materials produced for other industries (because of the by-products), and that in turn opens up opportunities for their expansion.

The technology developed by Prva Iskra is completely flexible, so that production can be efficient even for quantities of only one ton of biodiesel fuel. Incidentally, that kind of practice is already well-known in Austria, where individual producers get together at the county level and produce fuel and other by-products (oilseed meal, for example) for their own needs, Popovic says.

Although at first glance it may seem illogical, [line missing in original text] there are many more trivial things in evidence that we are self-sufficient), the state, according to Popovic, has remained aloof from this project. At Prva Iskra, they do not anticipate any assistance from the state, for that matter they have financed everything themselves up to now, but they do hope for an intelligent farm policy and more rational management of market surpluses. It would make sense if in its support price policy, and perhaps even with subsidies, the state "compelled" farmers to plant more rape this year, regardless of whether we enter next year as an international pariah or the sanctions are removed. That is, the shortage of raw materials for processing has in this phase been the bottleneck of the entire project.

Sava Popovic recalls in that connection that the stocks in commodity reserves contain about 80,000 tons of sunflower oil whose storage life is slowly expiring. That quantity could yield between 65,000 and 70,000 tons of biodiesel fuel. The processing facilities already exist, and its price would be less than 1 dinar per liter!

Serbia

Milosevic-Grachev Talks: Efforts Appreciated

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[Text] Belgrade, 26 Jul (TANJUG)—Slobodan Milosevic, president of the Republic of Serbia, received a Russian Federation delegation headed by Army General Pavel Grachev, the Russian defense minister, this evening. The delegation also comprises Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Vitaliy Churkin and high-ranking officials of the Russian Army.

The office of the Serbian president has announced that during cordial and frank talks they exchanged information and views on political issues of mutual interest, and on the course and most important aspects of the peace process in the former Bosnia-Herzegovina.

It was stressed that the Republic of Serbia deeply appreciated Russia's efforts aimed at ending the civil war and solving the crisis in the former Bosnia-Herzegovina by political means. Attention was focussed on the latest peace plan offered by the international community's Contact Group.

It was stressed that the Serb side in the former Bosnia-Herzegovina, as well as the whole of the Serb nation, sincerely wanted peace—a final and lasting peace. The establishing of peace, undoubtedly the most important aim, should be based on a comprehensive plan which, it was stressed, implies that the peace plan should—in addition to a solution to the territorial division—also encompass other issues, primarily constitutional solutions, as well as an agreement on lifting the economic sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, that is, the Serb people as a whole.

Expectations were expressed that Russia will use its influence to secure the unbiased treatment of the warring sides and prevent the imposition of one-sided solutions.

They also discussed the implementation of the mandate granted to the UN peace forces in the territory of the former Yugoslavia.

This evening's talks between President Milosevic and Russian Defense Minister Grachev were also attended by Colonel General Momcilo Perisic, the chief of general staff of the Yugoslav Army, and Gennadiy Shikin, the Russian ambassador in Belgrade.

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